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DO AS I SAY AND NOT AS I DO: DICKERSON,
CONSTITUTIONAL COMMON LAW AND
THE IMPERIAL SUPREME COURT
Kevin McNamee*
Alberto Napoli: you're under arrest for the murder of Nicholas
Lagrassa. You have the right to remain silent. Anything you say
can be used against you in a trial.
You have a right to an attorney. If you cannot afford one, one will
be appointed to you by a court of law. Do you understand these
rights?1
Not the least merit of our constitutional system is that its safe-




On January 27, 1997, Charles T. Dickerson confessed to a series
of bank robberies in Maryland and Virginia. In the subsequent
prosecution, the U.S. Attorney's Office based its case in large part
on evidence seized from Dickerson's automobile and on the con-
fession federal agents elicited from the defendant-all evidence,
Dickerson claimed, obtained in violation of the rights protected by
* J.D. Candidate, Fordham University School of Law, 2001; B.A., History, B.A.
English, Literature & Rhetoric, summa cum laude, Binghamton University, 1997. I
would like to thank several faculty members of Fordham Law School: Professor Mar-
tin Flaherty for valuable guidance and criticism in shaping this paper, Professor Ed-
ward Chikofsky for last minute criticism and suggestions, and Professors Daniel
Capra and Hugh Hansen, whose fascinating courses in Criminal Procedure and Con-
stitutional Law, respectively, first sparked my interest in Miranda and why judges rule
the way they do.
Thanks also to my colleagues and friends on the Editorial Board of the Fordham
Urban Law Journal, and to the staff members of the Journal, for their invaluable
comments and assistance. And finally, credit must be given where it is most due, and
volumes of credit must go to the McNamee family for unconditional support, love,
and, of course, a touch of humor.
1. Law & Order (NBC television broadcast, Feb. 25, 1998).
2. Hill v. Texas, 316 U.S. 400, 406 (1942).
3. United States v. Dickerson, 166 F.3d 667, 671 (4th Cir. 1999).
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the Fourth 4 and Fifth Amendments 5 to the United States
Constitution.6
At an evidentiary hearing,7 the United States District Court for
the Eastern District of Virginia denied Dickerson's motion to sup-
press the evidence seized from his car 8 and found that he volunta-
rily confessed to the federal agents.9 However, the District Court,
believing the story recounted by the defendant, suppressed the
confession he made at the FBI field office, because the federal
4. U.S. CONST. amend. IV ("The right of the people to be secure . . . against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated .... ").
5. U.S. CONST. amend. V ("No person.., shall be compelled in any criminal case
to be a witness against himself ... .
6. Dickerson, 166 F.3d at 671.
7. The Court has recognized the necessity of the trial court holding pretrial evi-
dentiary hearings to determine the admissibility of constitutionally suspect evidence,
such as potentially involuntary confessions or illegally searched or seized evidence.
E.g., Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368 (1964). The habeas corpus petitioner in Denno
argued that a New York procedure-which allowed the trial jury, where evidence
presented a fair question as to the voluntariness of a confession, to make the ultimate
conclusion as to both voluntariness and truthfulness-violated due process. The Court
vacated the lower federal courts' granting of the habeas writ, but ordered the case
remanded to the New York state court, id. at 396, stating that "[iut is both practical
and desirable that in cases to be tried hereafter a proper determination of voluntari-
ness be made prior to the admission of the confession to the jury which is adjudicating
guilt or innocence." Id. at 395.
8. United States v. Dickerson, 971 F. Supp. 1023, 1024 n.1 (E.D. Va. 1997). Dick-
erson claimed the search of his car was tainted as a "fruit of the poisonous tree" of his
illegal confession. Id. However, the District Court ruled that the automobile search
was supported by eyewitness accounts and the inevitable discovery doctrine. Id. (cit-
ing Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 432 (1984) (excusing an otherwise unconstitutional
search because the evidence obtained would have been discovered inevitably through
means completely independent of the illegal activity)).
9. The Supreme Court has long recognized that involuntary confessions are in-
herently untrustworthy, and that the Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimina-
tion and the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment both work to prevent
the presentation of involuntary confessions as evidence. E.g., Dickerson v. United
States, 120 S. Ct. 2326, 2330 (2000). "We have never abandoned this due process juris-
prudence, and thus continue to exclude confessions that were obtained involuntarily."
Id. at 2331; accord id. at 2347 (Scalia, J. dissenting) (explaining that the requirement
that a confession be voluntary remains the constitutional standard, governing the ad-
missibility of confessions where: (1) the Miranda rule does not apply, and (2) where
law enforcement officials obtain an involuntary confession while otherwise complying
with Miranda's technical rules).
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agents did not give the so-called Miranda warnings10 before Dick-
erson confessed.11
On interlocutory appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for
the Fourth Circuit reversed, agreeing with the U.S. Attorney that
the confession indeed was admissible in the prosecution's case-in-
chief.12 One year after hearing arguments on the admissibility of
the confession, the Fourth Circuit issued its bombshell holding-
Miranda v. Arizona no longer governed the admissibility of station
house confessions in federal courts, because Congress expressly
had overruled Miranda by statute.' 3 The United States Supreme
Court granted certiorari, setting the scene for a dramatic decision
on the fate of the venerable Miranda, a landmark decision arguably
on the scale of Brown v. Board of Education4 and Roe v. Wade,'5
10. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467-73 (1966) (Warren, C.J.). "The warnings
required [by this decision] and the waiver necessary ... are, in the absence of a fully
effective equivalent, prerequisites to the admissibility of any statement made by a
defendant." Id. at 476.
These warnings (which have come to be known colloquially as "Miranda
rights") are: a suspect "has the right to remain silent, that anything he says
can be used against him in a court of law, that he has the right to the pres-
ence of an attorney, and that if he cannot afford an attorney one will be
appointed for him prior to any questioning if he so desires.
Dickerson v. United States, 120 S. Ct. 2326, 2331 (2000) (Rehnquist, C.J.). For a fuller
discussion of both Dickerson and Miranda, see infra Parts II.A and III.
11. Dickerson, 971 F. Supp. at 1023.
12. United States v. Dickerson, 166 F.3d 667, 671 (4th Cir. 1999). Interestingly, the
Fourth Circuit ruled on a point not argued by the United States Attorney: that 18
U.S.C. § 3501 (1994), and not Miranda v. Arizona, governed the admissibility of Dick-
erson's confession. Id. at 680-81 ("[Tlhis was no simple oversight. The United States
Department of Justice took the unusual step of actually prohibiting the U.S. Attor-
ney's Office from briefing the issue [the applicability of 18 U.S.C. § 3501] .... Over
the last several years ... it has affirmatively impeded its enforcement."). The Fourth
Circuit did have a basis for ruling on grounds that had not been briefed and presented
at oral argument by the parties but only by amici curiae-Justice Scalia previously
had entertained the thought of sua sponte applying § 3501 in the face of the overall
refusal of every Administration since the enactment of § 3501 to apply the statute.
Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 464 (1994) (Scalia, J., concurring) ("But the
refusal to consider arguments not raised is a sound prudential practice, rather than a
statutory or constitutional mandate, and there are times when prudence dictates the
contrary.").
13. Dickerson, 166 F.3d at 695 (holding that § 3501 governed the admissibility of
confessions in federal court). The statute directs that criminal confessions are admissi-
ble if voluntarily given, and enumerates several factors the trial court should take into
consideration in its totality of the circumstances determination of the whether a chal-
lenged confession was voluntary. 18 U.S.C. § 3501(a)-(b) (1994).
14. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (9-0 decision) (declaring that le-
gally sanctioned racial segregation in public schools violates the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment).
15. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (declaring a woman's right to have an abor-
tion a fundamental right with which the state may not unduly interfere).
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and, symbolically, the pinnacle of the Warren Court's judicial activ-
ism 16 in the 1960s.
However, the fate of another, lesser-known doctrine also hinged
on the Court's determination of the constitutionality of Charles
Dickerson's station house confession. Much of "constitutional
common law" 17-an academic theory positing that the Supreme
Court has crafted a large body of subconstitutional rules that: (1)
are not compelled by the text of the Constitution, but (2) serve to
protect values implicit in the textl 8-rested on judicial maxims
tested, and perhaps greatly undermined, by the 7-2 majority opin-
ion in Dickerson v. United States.19
Part I of this Comment will present the theory of constitutional
common law, its central characteristics, and the ways it can be dis-
tinguished from "conventional" constitutional law2 0-rules that are
both derived from and compelled by the Constitution.21 In particu-
lar, Part I will discuss how the theory of constitutional common law
16. Judicial activism is a judicial philosophy which motivates judges to depart from
strict adherence to judicial precedent in favor of progressive or new social policies in
ways not always consistent with the restraint expected of appellate judges. BLACK'S
LAW DICTIONARY 847 (6th ed. 1990). Judicial opinions that result from judicial activ-
ism often intrude somewhat into legislative and executive matters. Id. Scholars have
dubbed the Supreme Court in both the early twentieth century and in the 1960s an
"activist" Court. E.g., Michal R. Belknap, The Warren Court And The Vietnam War:
The Limits Of Legal Liberalism, 33 GA. L. REV. 65, 65 (1998) ("Both those who
praise and those who condemn it characterize [Chief Justice Earl] Warren's tenure 'as
an age of unrelieved judicial activism in which one 'liberal' principle after another was
discovered in or written into the Constitution."'); Harold A. McDougall, Lawyering
And The Public Interest In The 1990s, 60 FORDHAM L. REV. 1, 24 (1991) (indicating
that the Supreme Court from the beginning of the twentieth century until the mid-
1930s was a "conservative activist court" which struck down much state and federal
economic regulation).
17. Henry P. Monaghan, Constitutional Common Law, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1, 2-3
(1975) (calling constitutional common law a "substructure of substantive, procedural,
and remedial rules . .. subject to amendment, modification, or even reversal by
Congress").
18. Id. at 2-3.
19. 120 S. Ct. 2326 (2000).
20. Though this Comment was inspired in large part by, and is a response to, Pro-
fessor Monaghan's article, it does not to use the terminology "true constitutional
law," Monaghan's label for what he called "Marbury-shielded constitutional exege-
sis," as opposed to constitutional common law, which Monaghan referred to as "con-
gressionally reversible constitutional law." Id. at 31. Calling some constitutional law
"true" may imply that law outside that category is not true, and the change of termi-
nology to the more neutral word "conventional" does not detract from the overall
theory.
21. See, e.g., Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971) (recognizing the
need to draw clear lines regarding the evils the Establishment Clause seeks to guard
against, and, thus, laying out a three-part test to determine whether a challenged gov-
ernmental act violates the Establishment Clause).
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co-exists with the constitutionally compelled doctrines of federal-
ism 22 and separation of powers,23 and how this theory may be nec-
essary to justify many of the Court's decisions during and since the
Warren era.
Part II of this Comment will analyze the Supreme Court's deci-
sion in Miranda v. Arizona, describe the "bright line rules "24 an-
nounced therein, and discuss the uncertainties of Miranda's
constitutional status created in the Court's lengthy analysis.25 Part
II will then survey the Supreme Court's later Miranda cases, which
largely backtracked on the Miranda holding and undermined it as a
constitutional precedent of the Court.26 Part II next will discuss
The First Amendment directs that "Congress shall make no law respecting an es-
tablishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof." U.S. CONST. amend.
I, cl. 1. The Supreme Court has long recognized that the prohibitions of the initial
clause of the First Amendment, the Establishment Clause, apply to the states via the
Fourteenth Amendment. Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 108 (1943); Bd. of
Educ. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687, 690 (1994) (declaring that the state of New York, in
setting up a special school district to specifically serve the Satmar Hasidim in the
village of Kiryas Joel, violated the Establishment Clause, which binds the states
through the Fourteenth Amendment).
22. Federalism is a doctrine concerned with maintaining the proper balance of
power in the relationship between the states and the federal government as dual sov-
ereigns in the federal system the Founders created in the Constitution. E.g., United
States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995). "As James Madison wrote: 'The powers dele-
gated by the proposed Constitution to the federal government are few and defined.
Those which are to remain in the State governments are numerous and indefinite.'"
Id. at 552 (citing THE FEDERALIST No. 45, at 292-93 (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961)).
23. Separation of powers is a doctrine concerned with maintaining the delicate
balance of power that the Founders designed within the framework of the Constitu-
tion between the three co-equal branches of the federal government. E.g., Metro.
Wash. Airports Auth. v. Citizens For The Abatement of Aircraft Noise, Inc., 501 U.S.
252, 276 (1991) ("If the power is executive, the Constitution does not permit an agent
of Congress to exercise it.").
24. Bright line rules are rules that courts feel are so sufficiently settled or are so
necessary to guide conduct that they will apply them without looking to the specific
facts of a given case. See STEPHEN A. SALTZBURG & DANIEL J. CAPRA, AMERICAN
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 243 (5th ed. 1996).
Some other examples of bright-line rules include the rules set forth in: (1) United
States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973) (granting police an automatic right to search
all arrestees incident to their lawful arrest); (2) New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454
(1981) (extending the Robinson arrest power rule to permit searches of the passenger
compartments of all automobiles incident to the lawful arrest of an occupant); and (3)
United States v. Socony-Vacuum, 310 U.S. 150 (1940) (declaring price fixing a per se
violation of the Sherman Antitrust Act and refusing to entertain economic justifica-
tions for per se violations).
25. E.g., Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467 (1966) ("Our decision in no way
creates a constitutional straitjacket . . ").
26. E.g., New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 651 (1984) (establishing a public
safety exception to the giving of the Miranda warnings, whereby a confession ob-
tained in violation of the Miranda rules will be admissible if eliciting the confession
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how, in light of the language and holdings of the Miranda jurispru-
dence, the bright line rules announced in 1966 to regulate station
house confessions were constitutional common law as per the the-
ory formulated by Professor Henry P. Monaghan, and thus subject
to the limitations of modification and nullification outlined in Part
1.27 Part II will conclude with a brief presentation of the direct
federal response to Miranda: Congress enacting 18 U.S.C. § 3501.28
This section will explain what § 3501 directs, and how it almost
wholly contradicts the directives of the Miranda decision, 29 all as
an introduction to the large issues the Court faced in Dickerson v.
United States.
Against the background of the Miranda jurisprudence and
§ 3501, Part III of this Comment will focus solely on the majority
opinion in Dickerson v. United States. In particular, Part III will
present Chief Justice Rehnquist's conclusion that Miranda v. Ari-
zona announced a constitutional decision of the Court that Con-
gress could not supersede by statute, and, in turn, discuss each
argument the Court presents to ground this conclusion. Part III
will set forth counterarguments to, and critiques of, each argument
as it is presented. Part III will conclude with a brief presentation of
the Dickerson Court's invocation of the doctrine of stare decisis,3°
upon which Miranda rested in large part,31 and argue that a weak
invocation of stare decisis cannot support the Court's holding.
was necessary to protect public safety); Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 224 (1970)
(permitting the use of a Miranda-defective confession by the prosecution to impeach
a defendant on cross-examination); Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 444 (1974)
("[T]hese procedural safeguards [are] not themselves rights protected by the Consti-
tution .... "); Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 306 n.1 (1985) ("[A] simple failure to
administer Miranda warnings is not in itself a violation of the Fifth Amendment.").
27. See infra Part I.D.3.
28. Dickerson v. United States, 120 S. Ct. 2326, 2332 (2000) (agreeing with the
Court of Appeals that Congress intended to overrule Miranda in enacting 18 U.S.C.
§ 3501).
29. For a thorough analysis of whether § 3501 would pass constitutional muster
conducted prior to the Court's decision in Dickerson, see Yale Kamisar, Can (Did)
Congress "Overrule" Miranda?, 85 Cornell L. Rev. 883 (2000). Prof. Kamisar pub-
lished this article before the Supreme Court handed down the decision in Dickerson,
but after the Court heard oral arguments in the case. However, the article is based on
a speech preceding oral arguments in Dickerson. See id.
30. Stare decisis is a judicial policy directing that the holdings of previously de-
cided cases should generally be followed in like cases. E.g., Margaret N. Kniffin,
Overruling Supreme Court Precedents: Anticipatory Action By United States Courts of
Appeals, 51 FORDHAM L. REV. 53, 54 (1982).
31. Professor Paulsen of the University of Minnesota Law School recently ad-
vanced a similar argument that Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), so lacks doctrinal
footing that it rests entirely on the doctrine of stare decisis. Michael Stokes Paulsen,
Abrogating Stare Decisis By Statute: May Congress Remove The Precedential Effect of
1244
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Part IV will argue that, by elevating Miranda to the level of con-
ventional constitutional law, the Dickerson majority may have gut-
ted the assumptions on which the theory of constitutional common
law is based and, in so doing, seriously infringed upon the very
constitutional principles of federalism and separation of powers32
the Rehnquist Court has often trumpeted.33 In conclusion, Part IV
will recommend ways the Court can place reasonable limits on the
breadth of its constitutional interpretation, but suggest that
whatever solution is imposed, it must originate from the Court
itself.
I. CONSTITUTIONAL COMMON LAW
A. A Rational Basis in Historical Tradition
Critics of the Supreme Court as an institution often charge it
with being a court of the "imperial judiciary,' 34 the self-appointed
Roe and Casey?, 109 YALE L.J. 1535, 1542 (2000) (arguing that a carefully drawn
statute abrogating the doctrine of stare decisis in some or all categories of constitu-
tional law is within Congress's power and should be upheld by the Court).
32. For an interesting debate on the separation of powers implications of the
Fourth Circuit's and the Supreme Court's decisions in Dickerson, compare Erwin
Chemerinsky, Point/Counterpoint: The Court Should Have Remained Silent: Why the
Court Erred in Deciding Dickerson v. United States, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 287, 292
(2000) ("[T]he actions of the Fourth Circuit and the Supreme Court in considering the
constitutionality of 3501 present[ ] a trifecta of separation of powers violations ....
[T]he courts' reaching the issue of the constitutionality of 3501 is gravely troubling."),
with Neal Devins, Point/Counterpoint: Asking The Right Questions: How The Courts
Honored the Separation of Powers By Reconsidering Miranda, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 251,
254 (2000) ("[C]ore separation of powers principles support the decisions .... [W]hile
the line separating judicial activism from judicial restraint may be murky, the respon-
sibility for each branch of government to independently interpret the law is clear.").
33. See, e.g., Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997) (Scalia, J.).
Just as the separation and independence of the coordinate branches of the
Federal Government serve to prevent the accumulation of excessive power
in any one branch, a healthy balance of power between the States and the
Federal Government will reduce the risk of tyranny and abuse from either
front.
Id. at 921 (quoting Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 458 (1991)); see also Melanie K.
St. Clair, Comment, A Return to States' Rights? The Rehnquist Court Revives Federal-
ism, 18 N. ILL. U. L. REv. 411, 422-23 (1998) (noting the Rehnquist Court's increased
willingness to strike down federal laws in the name of federalism); Joy Fallek, Note,
The Pain Relief Promotion Act: Will It Spell Death to "Death With Dignity" Or Is It
Unconstitutional?, 27 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1739, 1767 n.232 (2000) (noting the several
cases in the late 1990s indicating the Rehnquist Court's commitment to protecting
state sovereignty).
34. Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 996 (1992)
(Scalia, J., dissenting). "It is instructive to compare this Nietzschean vision of us
unelected, life-tenured judges... with the somewhat more modest role envisioned for
these lawyers by the Founders." Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting). "[T]he notion that the
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final arbiter of controversies in which it has no power or "place" to
intervene.35 Without delving into the ultimate merits of these
charges, it is worth noting that the vocal critics of the imperial judi-
ciary are indeed correct in asserting that the federal courts of the
United States are technically courts of limited jurisdiction marked
out by the Constitution and Congress,36 as opposed to state courts,
which are courts of general jurisdiction.37 As with the other
branches of the national government, we must look to the Consti-
tution for the grant of authority that gives the federal judiciary its
power-in this case, Article III of the Constitution, which contains
a positive grant of jurisdiction to the federal courts to hear cases
involving controversies of a constitutional nature.38
Court must adhere to a decision for as long as the decision faces 'great opposition'
and the Court is 'under fire' acquires a character of almost czarist arrogance." Id. at
999 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (emphasis added); accord Margaret G. Farrell, Revisiting
Roe v. Wade: Substance and Process in the Abortion Debate, 68 IND. L.J. 269, 307
(1993) (noting that "the resolution of questions of a fundamentally moral nature has
[long] been considered a state prerogative," and arguing that by federalizing abortion
rights, the Court performed a "diminution of state and legislative authority by judicial
pronouncement").
Similar criticism has been leveled at judges of lower courts as well. Editorial, Yon-
kers in Bondage, ORANGE COUNTY (CAL.) REG., Sept. 14, 1988, at B10 (calling Judge
Leonard B. Sand of the United States District Court for the Southern District of New
York a "tyrant" for ordering the New York City suburb of Yonkers to build low-
income housing in a white, middle class section of the city to remedy segregation in
housing despite a supposed lack of judicial power to order the building of housing of
any kind).
35. E.g., Casey, 505 U.S. at 1002 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("We should get out of this
area, where we have no right to be, and where we do neither ourselves nor the coun-
try any good by remaining.").
36. E.g., Rick Bragg, Florida Judge Upholds Jury's $145 Billion Punitive Award in
Tobacco Trial, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 7, 2000, at A18 (reporting that Judge Ursula Ungaro-
Benegas of the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida re-
manded a proceeding to state court because a union had never joined the litigation
against cigarette manufacturers, therefore denying the federal court jurisdiction based
on federal laws regarding labor unions).
37. E.g., Aldinger v. Howard, 427 U.S. 1, 15 (1976) (Rehnquist, J.) ("[F]ederal
courts, as opposed to state trial courts of general jurisdiction, are courts of limited
jurisdiction marked out by Congress.").
38. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1; e.g., Johnson v. United States, 120 S. Ct. 1795,
1800 (2000) (noting that the Court granted certiorari to determine whether applica-
tion of a federal statute violated the Ex Post Facto clause). The Ex Post Facto Clause,
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 3., will prohibit a law "that changes the punishment, and
inflicts a greater punishment, than the law annexed to the crime, when committed."
Johnson, 120 S. Ct. at 1800 (citing Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 390 (1798)).
Article III specifies the other areas to which the judicial power of the United States
courts may extend:
The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising
under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or
which shall be made, under their Authority;-to all Cases affecting Ambas-
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The federal courts have long used this grant of judicial power to
discern whether the acts of other branches of government, at both
the state39 and federal level, comply with the requirements of the
Constitution.4 ° This particular aspect of judicial authority is not
one that law students are presented with as a matter of first impres-
sion in a constitutional law survey course. In fact, from a young
sadors, other public ministers and Consuls;-to all Cases of admiralty and
maritime Jusrisdiction;-to Controversies to which the Untied States shall
be a Party;-to Controversies between two or more States;-between a
State and Citizens of another State;-between Citizens of different States;-
between Citizens of the same State claiming Lands under Grants of different
States, and between a State, or the Citizens thereof, and foreign States, Citi-
zens or Subjects.
U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
39. Although the states are dual sovereigns with the national government in the
federal system, the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution, art. VI, cl. 2, declares the
Constitution the supreme law of the United States. The Supreme Court long has held
that it follows from the Supremacy Clause that the Court's rulings on the Constitution
are binding on the states. E.g., Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958).
In Cooper, the unanimous Court held in sweeping language that its ruling in Brown
v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), that legally mandated segregation denied
people the equal protection of the laws guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment,
bound Arkansas state officials not party to the Brown suit:
Marbury v. Madison ... declared the basic principle that the federal judici-
ary is supreme in the exposition of the law of the Constitution, and that
principle has ever since been respected by this Court and the Country as a
permanent and indispensable feature of our constitutional system. It follows
that the interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment enunciated by this
Court in the Brown case is the supreme law of the land, and Art. VI of the
Constitution makes it of binding effect on the States ....
Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 18 (1958) (per curiam).
40. E.g., United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 552 (1995) (striking the federal Gun
Free School Zones Act of 1990, because it exceeded the authority granted to Con-
gress under the Commerce Clause of the U.S. Constitution to regulate interstate com-
merce); Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 654-55 (1952)
(Jackson, J., concurring) (striking down an act of President Truman via the Secretary
of Commerce for encroaching on the powers of Congress); Chandler v. Miller, 520
U.S. 305, 309 (1997) (striking down, as an unreasonable and therefore unconstitu-
tional search under the Fourth Amendment, a Georgia state law that mandated that
candidates for certain public offices take a urine test to prove they were not drug
users).
Chandler was the latest case in a line of decisions that permitted compelled urine
testing of certain public employees and public charges without a warrant and on a
lower quanta of proof than the usual Fourth Amendment standards of reasonable
suspicion or probable cause. E.g., Nat'l Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489
U.S. 656 (1989) (upholding compelled urinalysis of certain U.S. Customs Service offi-
cials, because the testing served the special need beyond criminal law enforcement of
ensuring that those charged with drug interdiction were drug-free); Vernonia Sch.
Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646 (1995) (upholding mandatory and suspicionless drug
testing because of the demonstrated special need of keeping school-age athletes drug-
free in a school where the athletes were known as the leaders of the "drug culture").
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age, American students are taught in social studies and history
textbooks that the Supreme Court will strike down government
acts that violate specific constitutional provisions. 41 Though this ju-
dicial power to review the acts of the legislative and executive
branches is unwritten in the text of the Constitution,42 and there-
fore continues to be debated among academics,43 the judicial
landmark of this power remains Chief Justice Marshall's opinion
for the Court in Marbury v. Madison.44 Marshall's classic exposi-
tion on the power of the federal judiciary45 still resonates today,
quoted even in the most conservative Supreme Court opinions de-
41. See, e.g., RICHARD HOFSTADTER ET AL., THE UNITED STATES 428 (3d ed.
1972) (noting that the Fourteenth Amendment provided legal grounds for the courts
to "declare unconstitutional" state regulations of railroads); NORMAN A. GRAEBNER
ET AL., A HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE 153 (2d ed. 1975) (teaching that the
Constitution vests the Supreme Court with power to interpret the Constitution "with
finality"); EDWARD L. AYERS ET AL., AMERICAN PASSAGES 655 (2000) (instructing
that the conservative activist Court of the early twentieth century struck down much
progressive legislation).
42. GERALD GUNTHER & KATHLEEN M. SULLIVAN, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 15
(13th ed. 1997) (noting the contrast between the unwritten status of judicial review in
the United States Constitution and the explicit grant of such power to the judiciary
within most twentieth century constitutions of other nations).
43. Id. at 17 (discussing the so-called "Hand-Wechsler debate" of the late 1950s
and early 1960s). The esteemed Judge Learned Hand of the United States Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit insisted that nothing in the Constitution gave the
Court the power to review the acts of Congress, and that judicial review violated the
separation of powers principles of the Constitution. However, Hand concluded that
the practical need of providing checks on governmental power justified judicial review
in situations in which the Court deemed it necessary. Id. at 17-18 (citing LEARNED
HAND, THE BILL OF RIGHTS 1-30 (1958)). Professor Herbert Wechsler, on the other
hand, argued that a fair reading of the Supremacy Clause of Article VI and the enu-
meration of the judicial powers in Article III indicates that judicial review is grounded
in the Constitution, that Marbury was not an extra-constitutional detour from the text
of the Constitution, and that broad discretion to abstain from reviewing acts violating
the Constitution departs from the judicial obligation to the Constitution. GUNTHER &
SULLIVAN, supra note 42, at 17-18 (citing HERBERT WECHSLER, Toward Neutral Prin-
ciples of Constitutional Law, in PRINCIPLES, POLITICS, AND FUNDAMENTAL LAW 4-10
(1961)).
44. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803) (striking down an act of Congress that expanded
the Court's jurisdiction, because it conflicted with the grant of judicial power in Arti-
cle III of the Constitution); see also Monaghan, supra note 17, at 2-3 (indicating that
but for the "mystique" of Marbury v. Madison, it might be easier to realize that what
appears to be "authoritative constitutional 'interpretation"' is actually constitutional
common law subject to Congress's power).
45. Though "classic" and firmly established in the federal judiciary, Marshall's
opinion does have its critics, who have called Marbury largely dicta, question-begging,
and a vast usurpation of governmental power. E.g., GUNTHER & SULLIVAN, supra
note 42, at 13-14 (citing Louis B. BOUDIN, GOVERNMENT By JUDICIARY (1932) (at-
tacking the legitimacy of judicial review), and RAOUL BERGER, CONGRESS V. THE
SUPREME COURT (1969) (defending the legitimacy of judicial review)).
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crying the broad scope of federal judicial power.46 In his unani-
mous opinion for the Court, Marshall opined:
It is, emphatically, the province and duty of the judicial depart-
ment, to say what the law is .... If two laws conflict with each
other, the courts must decide on the operation of each. So, if a
law be in opposition to the constitution... the court must deter-
mine which of these conflicting rules governs the case. This is of
the very essence of judicial duty. If then, the courts are to regard
the constitution, and the constitution is superior to any ordinary
act of the legislature, the constitution, and not such ordinary act,
must govern the case to which they both apply.47
Though Marshall later acknowledged that Marbury perhaps
swept too broadly in its discussion of the powers imbued in the
federal courts under Article 111,48 the Court never has sounded a
full-scale retreat from the implications of Marbury, so that today,
the Supreme Court is regarded widely as the legitimate ultimate
arbiter of whether actions by other branches of government con-
flict with the precepts of the Constitution.49
B. What is Constitutional Law?
A blanket statement that the Supreme Court's declarations of
constitutional law are the supreme law of the land via the
46. E.g., Dickerson v. United States, 120 S. Ct. 2326, 2338 (2000) (Scalia, J., dis-
senting) ("The power we recognized in Marbury will thus permit us, indeed require us,
to 'disregar[d]' § 3501, a duly enacted statute governing the admissibility of evidence
in the federal courts, only if it 'be in opposition to the constitution'-here, assertedly,
the dictates of the Fifth Amendment.") (emphasis added).
47. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177-78 (1803) (emphasis added).
48. GUNTHER & SULLIVAN, supra note 42, at 13 ("Marshall himself, in a rare ad-
mission of error...") (emphasis added) (citing Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat)
264, 400-02 (1821)). "But in the reasoning of the court in support of [Marbury], some
expressions are used which go far beyond it." Cohens, 19 U.S. at 400.
In Cohens, the State of Virginia argued had that the Court could not exercise appel-
late jurisdiction in the case, because Article III granted the Court only original juris-
diction over cases in which a state was a party. However, the Cohens Court, in an
opinion by Chief Justice Marshall, extended its analysis in Martin v. Hunter's Lessee,
14 U.S. (1 Wheat) 304 (1816), to defend the legitimacy of review of state court judg-
ments at the federal level. Marshall ultimately concluded that the judicial power of
the federal courts "extends to all cases arising under the constitution or a law of the
United States, whoever may be the parties." Cohens, 19 U.S. at 392; see also text
accompanying infra note 74.
49. GUNTHER & SULLIVAN, supra note 42, at 25 (indicating that Cooper v. Aaron,
358 U.S. 1 (1958), is the major foundation in the Court's modern jurisprudence for the
public's widely held view that the Court's interpretation of the Constitution is the
supreme law of the land); see also text accompanying supra note 39.
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Supremacy Clause50 sheds little light on an even more basic ques-
tion: what is considered constitutional law? The answer to this
question is of great import, for the Supreme Court's dictates on the
law it considers within the ambit of the Constitution remain the
final authority on the subject, absent the long and difficult process
of amending the Constitution, 51 or a reversal by the Court itself.5 2
Outright reversal by the Court can be an uncertain prospect, given
individual Justices' stated reluctance 53 to overturn even cases they
previously criticized.54
Given this finality of the Court's constitutional dictates, we are
left attempting to define, in a meaningful and satisfactory way,
what is "constitutional law." Are the Court's inviolable constitu-
tional dictates limited to its interpretations of the law as stated in
the text of the Constitution-e.g., that imposition and carrying out
of the death penalty, under the criminal justice systems that existed
in the United States as of 1972, constituted cruel and unusual pun-
ishment in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments? 55
Or does the phrase "constitutional law" sweep within its scope Su-
preme Court precedent that protects values inherent in, though not
necessarily explicitly set forth in, the text of the Constitution-e.g.,
the zone of personal privacy vindicated by the First Amendment
right of free association, the Third Amendment prohibition of the
quartering of soldiers, the Fourth Amendment prohibition of un-
reasonable searches and seizures, and the Fifth Amendment right
50. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 ("This Constitution... shall be the supreme Law of
the Land.").
51. Amending the Constitution requires: (1) a two-thirds vote of both Houses of
Congress or the application of two-thirds of the state legislatures, in order to call for a
Convention for proposing the amendment; and (2) ratification by the legislatures of
three-quarters of the states, or by Conventions in three-quarters of the states. U.S.
CONST. art. V.
52. E.g., Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 235 (1997) (stating that stare decisis
concerns are at their weakest when the Court interprets the Constitution, because
overturning that interpretation requires constitutional amendment or a reversal by
the Court) (citation omitted).
53. See, e.g., Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 406 (1932) (Bran-
deis, J., dissenting) ("[I]n most matters it is more important that the applicable rule of
law be settled than that it be settled right.").
54. See, e.g., Dickerson v. United States, 120 S. Ct. 2326, 2337 (2000) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) (indicating that three Justices-Justices O'Connor and Kennedy and Chief
Justice Rehnquist-whose votes were needed to compose the majority that held that
Miranda is a constitutional decision, are on record in the United States Reports as
believing that a violation of Miranda is not a violation of the Constitution).
55. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 239-40 (1972) (per curiam).
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against self-incrimination? 56 Furthermore, do the rules the Su-
preme Court has fashioned to secure underlying constitutional
rights, though they admittedly are not compelled by the Constitu-
tion, rise to the level of inviolable (at least by the other branches of
government) "constitutional law?" For example, the Court has
stated that the Fourth Amendment's exclusionary rule-under
which courts in both levels of the federal system generally 57 must
exclude evidence obtained by government agents by unconstitu-
tional searches or seizures-is not compelled by the Constitution. 8
Is the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule, imposed by the Su-
preme Court on the states, "constitutional law?" 59
In his seminal article a quarter-century ago, Professor Henry P.
Monaghan argued that the Court's great institutional prestige
tended to prevent meaningful inquiry into whether every single Su-
preme Court decision implicating the Constitution deserved the
same dignity as the document itself.6" Professor Monaghan argued
that, indeed, much of what passes as constitutional dictate is actu-
ally constitutional common law (as opposed to conventional consti-
tutional law), a "substructure of substantive, procedural, and
remedial rules" inspired by-but not required by-the Constitu-
tion, and subject to amendment, modification, and outright rever-
sal by Congress and the states.6'
However, Monaghan realized that a host of issues rendered the
theory problematic, issues such as the doctrinal underpinnings of
56. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965) ("[These] specific guaran-
tees in the Bill of Rights have penumbras, formed by emanations from those guaran-
tees that help give them life and substance. Various guarantees create zones of
privacy.") (citation omitted).
57. The exclusionary rule is not ironclad. The Court has fashioned exceptions to it
based on a cost-benefit analysis-whether the benefits of the exclusionary rule (deter-
ring future police misconduct) outweigh the societal cost (keeping probative evidence
from the trier of fact). See, e.g., Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 (1978) (declining to
extend the benefits of the exclusionary rule to the defendant, the passenger of a vehi-
cle that was illegally searched, because the Fourth Amendment rights of the defen-
dant were not implicated by the illegal search of the property of the driver of the car).
58. E.g., United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984). For a more detailed discus-
sion of the Leon Court's conclusions, see text accompanying infra note 95.
59. The fate of the exclusionary rule announced in Miranda v. Arizona turned on
the Supreme Court's resolution of much the same question. Despite language seem-
ingly to the contrary in both Miranda and its progeny, the Supreme Court announced
that the Miranda exclusionary rule was indeed constitutional in nature and therefore
not within Congress's power to overturn by statute. Dickerson v. United States, 120 S.
Ct. 2326, 2336 (2000). For a more detailed discussion of Miranda and Dickerson, see
infra Parts IIA-B. and III.
60. Monaghan, supra note 17, at 2.
61. Id. at 2-3.
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federal common law,62 the validity of imposing subconstitutional
law upon the states and Congress, 63 and the establishment of
meaningful distinctions between constitutional common law and
conventional constitutional law,64 which is not subject to the whims
of the other political branches under the Marbury tradition65 and
the Supremacy Clause.66
C. Constitutional Common Law as a Subset of Valid
Federal Common Law
Though some scholars bristle at the suggestion that the federal
system has a common law, citing the vocal rejection of the corpus
of general federal common law by Justice Brandeis in Erie Rail-
road Co. v. Tompkins,67 others point out that denying completely
the existence of some sort of federal common law is overbroad.
Though the Erie Doctrine and the Rules of Decision Act68 limit the
scope of federal common law by emphasizing the primacy of state
common law in areas of state concern, a large body of interstitial
decisional law has grown from the federal courts' interpretation of
federal statutory law. A cursory inspection of Supreme Court deci-
sions reveals just that-the United States Reports currently has 531
volumes and grows by several editions with every term of the
Court,69 thus buttressing the argument that some sort of federal
common law must exist,70 albeit common law of a specialized
62. E.g., id. at 12-13.
63. E.g., id. at 23.
64. E.g., id. at 31-34.
65. Id. at 31.
66. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
67. 304 U.S. 64 (1938) (rejecting the holding of Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1
(1842), and formulating the so-called "Erie Doctrine," whereby federal courts hearing
a case involving state law must apply the common law of the state and not federal
common law principles). For example, federal courts in New York, in adjudicating a
state-law negligence claim, must apply the rules governing duty and foreseeability
announced by the New York Court of Appeals. E.g., Petition of Kinsman Transit Co.,
338 F.2d 708, 721-22 (2d Cir. 1964) (citing Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R., 162 N.E. 99
(N.Y. 1928) (Cardozo, Ch. J.)).
68. 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (1994) ("The laws of the several states, except where the
Constitution or treaties of the United States or Acts of Congress otherwise require or
provide, shall be regarded as rules of decision in civil actions in the courts of the
United States, in cases where they apply.").
69. For example, the Court's October Term of 1996 filled volumes 519 through 521
of the United States Reports.
70. Some scholars have pointed out that there is simply too much law in those 531
volumes for the Court's jurisprudence not to encompass large tracts of federal com-
mon law. See, e.g., Martha A. Field, Sources of Law: The Scope of Federal Common
Law, 99 HARV. L. REV. 883, 883 (1986) (arguing that the Court has set no meaningful
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sort.7' In an admittedly enthusiastic defense of Erie a generation
after that case was decided, Judge Friendly of the United States
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit argued:
Establishing a body of substantive law for federal courts in mat-
ters not otherwise of federal concern is not a legitimate end
within the scope of the Constitution; thus to frustrate the ability
of the states to make their laws fully effective in areas generally
reserved to them would be inconsistent with the constitutional
plan.72
Judge Friendly observed that by restricting the scope of a "general"
federal common law covering all areas of the law that the federal
courts might hear in the exercise of federal question,73 diversity,74
and supplemental 75 jurisdiction, the Erie Doctrine created a body
of specialized federal common law. 76 The upshot of the emergence
limits on judicial power to make federal law and that the bounds of federal common
law are greater than realized).
71. Henry J. Friendly, In Praise of Erie-And of the New Federal Common Law,
39 N.Y.U. L. REV. 383 (1964).
72. Id. at 397 (emphasis added). Friendly also defended Erie against charges that it
handcuffed federal courts from regulating procedure and the admission of evidence in
diversity jurisdiction cases-"the inferior courts have been busily giving effect to the
[Federal] Rules [of Civil Procedure], even in cases where in every realistic sense their
application might produce a different result from what would have obtained in a state
court 'a block away."' Id. at 403. At the time Friendly wrote, the Federal Rules of
Evidence had not yet been enacted, but Friendly urged that "evidence [was] not
within the Erie Doctrine." Id. (citation omitted).
73. 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1994) ("The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of
all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.").
74. Id. § 1332 (granting the federal district courts original jurisdiction of civil ac-
tions between citizens of different states where the amount in controversy exceeds
$75,000). The fear that local triers of law and fact would not or could not be impartial
to a citizen of another state animates the § 1332 diversity jurisdiction of the federal
courts. E.g., Northeast Nuclear Energy Co. v. Gen. Electric, 435 F. Supp. 344, 346 (D.
Conn. 1977). This concern also permeated the Supreme Court's decisions to uphold
federal appellate jurisdiction to review state court judgments resting on federal law in
Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat) 304 (1816), and Cohens v. Virginia, 19
U.S. (6 Wheat) 264 (1821). Due to the importance the Constitution places on the
independence of judges and the fact that state court judges depend on the state legis-
latures for their salaries and offices, the Marshall Court declined "to suppose that [the
Constitution] intended to leave ... constitutional questions to tribunals where this
independence may not exist." Cohens, 19 U.S. at 387.
75. 28 U.S.C. § 1367 (1994).
[I]n any civil action of which the district courts have original jurisdiction, the
district courts shall have supplemental jurisdiction over all other claims that
are so related to claims in the action within such original jurisdiction that
they form part of the same case or controversy under Article III of the
United States Constitution.
Id. § 1367(a).
76. Friendly, supra note 71, at 405.
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of this specialized federal common law, argued Friendly, is that
Erie has left to the states "what ought be left to them,"77 while at
the same time creating a uniform and predictable 78 body of federal
decisional law in areas of truly national concern.79
Erie also resulted in a sort of deferential give-and-take-just as
the Erie Doctrine demanded that the federal courts conform to
state law in areas of state concern, state courts also had to conform
to federal decisions, because "having rid itself of subconscious guilt
for federal poaching on state preserves, the Supreme Court be-
came freer to insist on deference to federal decisions by the states
where deference was due. 80
Writing only twenty-six years after Erie, Friendly concluded that
the specialized federal common law "developed ... fruitfully and
will develop more." 81 The jurisprudence of the Sherman Antitrust
Act82 provides a concrete illustration of the broad scope of modern
specialized federal common law. Section one of the statute directs:
"Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or
conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce ... is hereby declared
to be illegal."83 Contrast this unequivocal language with the decid-
edly different approach the Court has taken in its jurisprudence of
§ 1, as summarized in State Oil Co. v. Khan.84 In Khan, Justice
O'Connor declared for the unanimous Court: "[T]his Court has
long recognized that Congress intended only to outlaw unreasona-
ble restraints. '85 What is the effect of the Court's reading of the
statute? At the very least, the Supreme Court has so emphasized
the rich common law tradition of the Sherman Act that, arguably,
the plain meaning of the statutory prohibition of all contracts, com-
binations, and conspiracies in restraint of free trade informs mod-
77. Id.
78. Judge Friendly argued that under the pre-Erie doctrine announced by the
Court in Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842), federal judges, "governed by a
needle so erratic as 'a benign and prudent comity,'" had enormous discretion to fol-
low state decisional law of which they approved, but could freely disregard state law
with which they disagreed. Friendly, supra note 71, at 388 (quoting Justice Cardozo's
opinion in Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Johnson, 293 U.S. 335, 339-40 (1934)).
79. Friendly, supra note 71, at 384, 405.
80. Id. at 407 ("[S]tate courts must conform to federal decisions in areas where
Congress, acting within powers granted to it, has manifested ... an intention to that
end.").
81. Id. at 384.
82. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2000) (forbidding contracts, combinations, and conspiracies in
restraint of free trade, as well as monopolization).
83. Id.: § 1(a).
84. State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 10 (1997) (9-0 decision).
85. Id. at 10.
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ern antitrust decisions in no meaningful way. 6 At most, the fair
implication of O'Connor's declaration is that the Court has co-
opted the statute, placing the archetypal antitrust statute in a non-
informative role at the periphery of the Court's antitrust jurispru-
dence-the plain meaning of the statute now is replaced by a judg-
ment as to what Congress must have (albeit in the Court's mind)
intended in passing the statute. Antitrust law, a supposed creature
of statute, has morphed into a subcategory of specialized federal
common law in an area of truly national concern, thus reinforcing
the validity of federal common law as a theoretical concept.
D. The Problem of Definitions: Are There Lines in the Sand
Separating Conventional Constitutional Law from
Constitutional Common Law?
Some scholars have proposed that the Supreme Court has a rich
common law tradition in its constitutional interpretation, and that
a theory of constitutional common law helps explain adequately
the Court's constitutional law jurisprudence.87 In his article Consti-
tutional Common Law,88 Professor Monaghan attempted to define
the central characteristics that separate conventional constitutional
law in the Marbury tradition from violable constitutional common
law. 89 Part of the difficulty in drawing such lines in the sand, ar-
gued Monaghan, is that no black-and-white distinction exists be-
tween the two-the difference is a matter of degree. 90
Constitutional common law, therefore, ultimately remains an
86. E.g., id. at 10 (citation omitted). Most restraints on trade challenged as viola-
tions of § 1 of the Sherman Act are examined using the venerable "Rule of Reason"
announced in Chicago Board of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231 (1918) (Brandeis,J.):
The true test of legality is whether the restraint imposed is such as merely
regulates and perhaps thereby promotes competition or whether it is such as
may suppress or even destroy competition. To determine that question the
court must ordinarily consider the facts peculiar to the business to which the
restraint is applied; its condition before and after the restraint was imposed;
the nature of the restraint and its effect, actual or probable. The history of
the restraint, the evil believed to exist, the reason for adopting the particular
remedy, the purpose or end sought to be attained, are all relevant facts.
Chi. Bd. of Trade, 246 U.S. at 238. Chicago Board of Trade and Erie are among Bran-
deis's best-known opinions. CHARLES M. HARR & MICHAEL ALLAN WOLF, LAND
USE PLANNING 371 (4th ed. 1989).
87. Monaghan, supra note 17, at 3.
88. Id. at 33.
89. Id. at 30-34 (discussing the proffered definitions and characteristics of constitu-
tional common law and the problems inherent in each).
90. Id. at 33 (citing PAUL M. BATOR ET AL., HART'S & WECHSLER'S THE FED-
ERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 770 (2d ed. 1973)).
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amorphous body of law. This is due in part to the Court's failure to
recognize it explicitly as official doctrine, though a few defining
characteristics can be culled from the law Monaghan identified as
constitutional common law.
1. Constitutional Compulsion?
One characteristic shared by much of constitutional common law
is the Court's insistence that the rule crafted is not technically com-
pelled by the Constitution but exists to vindicate rights or values
protected by the Constitution.91 Monaghan argued that the distinc-
tion between constitutional common law and conventional consti-
tutional law is the degree to which the rule questioned is
"perceived [by the individual Justices] to be related to the core pol-
icies underlying the constitutional provision. "92 The jurisprudence
of the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule, which directs that evi-
dence seized by the government in violation of the constitutional
prohibition of unreasonable searches and seizures generally should
not be admitted into evidence,93 provides a convincing example.
Maxim I of the exclusionary rule: Exclusion is not a personal
right. In its exclusionary rule cases, the Court has stated the rule is
not a personal right guaranteeing that a new constitutional viola-
tion will not occur by the introduction of the illegal evidence at
trial.94 Instead, the Court insists, exclusion is a judicially created
and mandated remedy designed to deter future police misconduct
and to prevent the government from benefiting from unconstitu-
tional acts.95 During the 1960s, the Warren Court declared that ex-
clusion is a remedy essential to and flowing from the right of
privacy guaranteed by due process. 9 6 However, later Courts under
Chief Justices Burger and Rehnquist, in focusing increasingly on
whether the principles underlying the rule justified its application
91. Monaghan, supra note 17, at 2-3.
92. Id. at 33.
93. E.g., Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (binding the Fourth Amendment ex-
clusionary rule on the states via the Fourteenth Amendment).
94. United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 906 (1984).
95. Id. at 906. The Leon Court concluded that the exclusionary rule is not man-
dated by the Constitution because: (1) the rule is found nowhere in the text of the
Fourth Amendment; (2) it does not retroactively cure the constitutional violation,
which occurs singularly at the moment of the illegal search or seizure, and not again
with the introduction of the evidence at trial; and (3) because it only operates as a
judicially created safeguard of Fourth Amendment principles, as opposed to a vindi-
cator of the constitutional rights of the aggrieved person. Id. at 905-06 (citations
omitted).
96. E.g., Mapp, 367 U.S. at 655-56.
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in the proceeding at hand,97 arguably detached the rule entirely
from the realm of personal rights, leaving it "simply a matter of
remedial detail. '98 In 1975, Monaghan based his conclusion that
the Court had moved away from a personal rights theory on the
Court's analysis in both United States v. Calandra99 and United
States v. Peltier.100 The intervening years only have solidified the
doctrinal shift-indeed, the exclusionary rule is now: (1) neither a
necessary corollary of the Fourth Amendment, 10 1 (2) nor intended
or even able to cure the invasion of the defendant's rights, °2 and
(3) invoked only when its policy of deterrence is furthered.10 3
This shift away from a rights-based approach to the application
of the exclusionary rule is problematic, for, absent its review of
state court judgments for violations of the Constitution, the Su-
preme Court admittedly lacks supervisory power over state
courts.1 04 Yet the Court mandates that the states comply with the
various exclusionary rules 0 5 in situations in which the Court has
deemed exclusion applicable.106 Without allowing for the possibil-
97. United States v. Peltier, 422 U.S. 531 (1975). "[W]e simply decline to extend
the court-made exclusionary rule to cases in which its deterrent purpose would not be
served." Id. at 538 (citing Desist v. United States, 394 U.S. 244, 254 n.24 (1969)).
98. Monaghan, supra note 17, at 3-4.
99. 414 U.S. 338 (1974).
100. 422 U.S. 531 (1975).
101. See United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 906 (1984).
102. Id. at 906; see also United States v. Ceccolini, 435 U.S. 268, 279-81 (1978) (indi-
cating that, in a case in which the Court denied application of the exclusionary rule,
the police officer did not commit the constitutional violation intentionally).
103. E.g., Ceccolini, 435 U.S. at 279-80.
The penalties visited upon the government, and in turn upon the public, be-
cause its officers have violated the law, must bear some relation to the pur-
poses which the law is to serve .... Application of the exclusionary rule in
this situation could not have the slightest deterrent effect on the behavior of
[the] officer .... The cost ... is too great for an evenhanded system of law
enforcement to bear in order to secure such a speculative and very likely
negligible deterrent effect.
Id.
104. E.g., Mu'Min v. Virginia, 500 U.S. 415, 422 (1991) ("[I]n state courts ... our
authority is limited to enforcing the commands of the United States Constitution.");
Aldinger v. Howard, 427 U.S. 1, 15 (1976) (Rehnquist, J.) ("[F]ederal courts, as op-
posed to state trial courts of general jurisdiction, are courts of limited jurisdiction
marked out by Congress.").
105. E.g., Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655-56 (1961) (excluding evidence violating
the Fourth Amendment violation); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (exclud-
ing evidence violating the Fifth Amendment right against self incrimination); United
States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967); Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263 (1967) (exclud-
ing evidence violating the Sixth Amendment right to the effective assistance of coun-
sel at trial).
106. E.g., Mapp, 367 U.S. at 655-56.
1257
1258 FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL [Vol. XXVIII
ity of constitutional common law, the Court corners itself into the
untenable position of admitting that it compels state compliance
with non-constitutional law in violation of the very federalism con-
cerns the Court often unpopularly champions. °7 In addition, the
states are usually granted wide latitude in remedying "even federal
primary rights."'1 8 Yet the Supreme Court has affixed its formula-
tions of what will remedy a Fourth Amendment violation upon the
states. 10 9
Maxim II of the exclusionary rule: Application turns on deter-
rence. The Court also has stated that the exclusionary rule, since it
is grounded in a policy of deterrence, should be "restricted to
those areas where its remedial objectives are thought most effica-
ciously served."' 10 In accordance with this general guide, federal
courts, after balancing the costs and benefits of the exclusionary
rule, have refused to extend the exclusionary rule far beyond the
context of the criminal trials, thus sanctioning the use of unconsti-
tutionally searched-and-seized evidence in a variety of situations:
grand jury proceedings, 1" civil tax proceedings, 2 civil deportation
proceedings," 3 habeas corpus proceedings,1' 4 and sentencing
hearings. 15
107. E.g., United States v. Morrison, 120 S. Ct. 1740 (2000) (striking down the Vio-
lence Against Women Act, Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat. 1902 (1994), as beyond
Congress's power under the Commerce Clause, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3).
108. Monaghan, supra note 17, at 3 (citing Henry Paul Monaghan, First Amend-
ment "Due Process," 83 HARV. L. REV. 518, 547-51 (1970). Contra Monaghan, supra
note 17, at 3 ("On the other hand, substantive constitutional guarantees can have
important remedial dimensions, and it seems clear that state courts must, in the exer-
cise of their general jurisdiction, provide remedies thought 'indispensable' to the un-
derlying guarantee.").
109. E.g., Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655-56 (1961).
110. United States v. Peltier, 422 U.S. 531, 538-39 (1975) (citing United States v.
Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348 (1974)); see also case cited supra note 57 and accompany-
ing text.
111. United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338 (1974).
112. United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433 (1976).
113. INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032 (1984).
114. Stone v. Powell, 426 U.S. 465 (1976). Under Stone, no federal court may re-
view a state court ruling on Fourth Amendment issue absent the Supreme Court
granting certiorari in the matter. SALTZBURG & CAPRA, supra note 24, at 431.
115. E.g., United States v. Tejada, 956 F.2d 1256 (2d Cir. 1992) (refusing to extend
the benefits of the exclusionary rule to sentencing, because the government is de-
terred enough by its inability to use the illegally obtained evidence at trial, and be-
cause the need to deter police misconduct does not outweigh the policy of providing
sentencing judges with as much information as possible). The Tejada court went be-
yond deterrence policy in holding that sentencing judges must consider illegally ob-
tained evidence, thus greatly increasing the defendant's sentence mandated by the
Federal Sentencing Guidelines, which bases drug sentences in part on the quantity of
drugs involved. E.g., U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2D1.1.(c) (2000) (set-
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Standing in stark contrast to this jurisprudence is the Supreme
Court's case law regarding involuntary and coerced confessions.
The Court has held that notions of due process forbid the govern-
ment from using an involuntary confession for any purpose.'16 Use
of such a tainted confession violates due process because it immu-
tably impairs the truth-telling function of the proceeding. 1 7 A
side-by-side comparison is illustrative: The exclusionary rule, a
remedy not compelled by the Constitution, 118 does not forbid the
government from impeaching a defendant's testimony on cross-ex-
amination using evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth
Amendment." 9 The Supreme Court has reasoned that after the
defendant "opens the door" to the use of the evidence, exclusion is
not required. The policy of deterrence is satisfied by the inability
ting forth a "Drug Quantity Table," under which, for example, "150 kilograms or
more of Cocaine" results in a "Base Offense Level" of 38, while "At least 50 KG but
less than 150 KG of Cocaine" results in the smaller "Base Offense Level" of 36).
If a lengthy criminal sentence is the ultimate reward of effective law enforcement,
Tejada thus rewards (and provides an incentive for) unconstitutional police conduct in
those many cases where a small portion of drugs is legally searched or seized, while
the larger part is unconstitutionally obtained by law enforcement. Compare United
States v. Tejada, 956 F.2d 1256 (2d Cir. 1992) with Monaghan, supra note 17, at 5
(discussing the "judicial 'clean hands doctrine,'" whereby courts should exclude ille-
gally obtained evidence in order to prevent the court from becoming a "partner in the
wrongdoing" with the government agent).
116. E.g., Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 441 (1974); Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S.
298, 304 (1985); Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 398 (1978).
The Court articulated its current standards governing the admission of involuntary
confessions under due process analysis in Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279 (1991).
Under Fulminante, and in accordance with long-standing Supreme Court precedent, a
reviewing court must first decide whether the challenged confession was involuntary
or coerced, looking to the totality of the circumstances. Id. at 285-86 (White, J., writ-
ing for the Court on this holding). However, in departing with long-standing prece-
dent, the divided Fulminante Court held that once a confession was deemed
involuntary, the reviewing court must conduct a second inquiry as to whether the
government can prove beyond a reasonable doubt that admission of the confession
was harmless. Id. at 310 (Rehnquist, C.J., writing for the Court on this holding).
Fulminante did not vitiate the Mincey standard that involuntary confessions may not
used for any purpose-it added the additional inquiry into whether the admission of
the confession was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
117. Contra United States v. Peltier, 422 U.S. 531, 535-36 (1975).
118. E.g., text accompanying supra note 95.
119. United States v. Havens, 446 U.S. 620 (1980) (holding that evidence running
afoul of the Fourth Amendment may be used to impeach, regardless of when-during
direct examination or cross-examination-the defendant "opened the door" to the
impeachment of his testimony). Courts may also admit Miranda-defective confessions
for impeachment purposes. Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971) (grounding its
holding in the fact that the Miranda warnings are not required by the Constitution).
But trial courts should not admit truly involuntary confessions to impeach, because to
do so violates due process. Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385 (1976).
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of the government to use the evidence until such time as the defen-
dant opens the door by giving untruthful testimony. In this con-
text, deterring police misconduct via complete exclusion at trial is
outweighed by the costs of this remedy-in essence, the truth-tell-
ing function of a hearing that is so critical to due process is actually
impaired by permitting a lie to go uncontradicted by evidence
culled in violation of the Fourth Amendment.12 0 However, due
process, a right guaranteed by the Constitution,2 1 provides an ab-
solute bar 12 2 to the use of a coerced or involuntary confession to
impeach the defendant's testimony. The reviewing courts, after
conducting a harmless error inquiry,123 should refuse admission of
this tainted evidence without regard to the policies of
deterrence. 24
Thus, with exclusion of evidence under the Fourth Amendment,
the Court fashioned a rule: (1) not compelled by the text of the
Amendment, but (2) that the Court makes mandatory in state and
federal courts, in order (3) to protect and vindicate the principles
of privacy and human dignity implicit in the text by (4) deterring
future misconduct. A fair reading of this jurisprudence indicates
that the judicially created Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule
fits snugly within the theory of constitutional common law.
2. Bright Line Rules
Much constitutional common law is framed in terms of bright
line rules that do not look to the specifics of the case to see if the
120. Havens, 446 U.S. at 627.
121. U.S. CONST. amend. V; U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
122. The effectiveness of this "absolute bar" in reality is doubtful, because post-
Warren era federal courts have raised the bar considerably as to what types of confes-
sions will offend due process. Compare Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315 (1959) (con-
cluding that due process was offended because the suspect's will was overcome by
official pressure, fatigue, and sympathy falsely aroused in a post-indictment setting),
with Purvis v. Dugger, 932 F.2d 1413, 1422 (11th Cir. 1991) (holding that petitioner's
confession was voluntary in a case in which the petitioner had a history of schizophre-
nia, was susceptible to authority figures, and had a childlike mentality, but where
there was no evidence of police coercion), and United States v. Macklin, 900 F.2d 948,
950, 951 (6th Cir. 1990) (holding that the defendants' confessions were voluntary in a
case in which one defendant was "mildly mentally retarded" and the other was "bor-
derline mentally retarded," but where there was no evidence of police coercion).
123. Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 310 (1991) (Rehnquist, C.J., writing for
the Court on this holding).
124. Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 398-01 (1978) (holding that due process was
violated by the use of a confession obtained when the defendant, who had arrived at
the hospital almost in a coma, was in intensive care, heavily medicated, and had a
breathing tube down his throat).
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125questioned act actually violated the Constitution, as opposed to
the more factually intensive totality of the circumstances 12 6 inquir-
ies often explicit in conventional constitutional law jurispru-
dence.12 7 Consider, for example, the bright line rules crafted by the
Court in Roe v. Wade.128 In Roe, the Court announced that the
right of privacy recognized by various guarantees in the Constitu-
tion1 29 is broad enough to encompass the decision of a woman
whether or not to terminate her pregnancy.1 30 Thus, the Court de-
clared that abortion rights were constitutionally protected. 31  To
facilitate what the Court later called "Roe's essential holding' 3 2-
that fetal viability marked the point in the pregnancy at which the
state's interest in the life of the developing fetus became sufficient
to overcome the woman's liberty interest in the abortion deci-
sion-the Roe Court crafted a set of rules framed by the trimesters
of the human gestation period.1 33  In particular, the Court
announced:
125. For a discussion of bright line rules and some examples in the Court's constitu-
tional and statutory interpretation jurisprudence, see supra note 24.
126. When a court conducts a "totality of the circumstances" inquiry, it looks to all
the events surrounding a challenged act to determine, with no single factor disposi-
tive, whether the law has been violated. Some examples of totality of the circum-
stances inquiries include a court's review of: (1) confessions under the Due Process
Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, e.g., Schneckloth v. Bustamonte,
412 U.S. 218, 226 (1973); (2) the undue burden test for abortion regulations an-
nounced in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833,
876-77 (1992); and (3) the "Rule of Reason" of antitrust law discussed supra note 86.
127. On this point, this Comment diverges markedly from Professor Monaghan's
conclusion that a satisfactory distinction cannot be drawn from a bright line-totality
of the circumstances dichotomy. Monaghan, supra note 17, at 32-33.
128. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
129. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965) ("[These] specific guaran-
tees in the Bill of Rights have penumbras, formed by emanations from those guaran-
tees that help give them life and substance. Various guarantees create zones of
privacy.") (citation omitted).
130. Roe, 410 U.S. at 153.
131. Roe, 410 U.S. at 170 (Stewart, J., concurring). Interestingly, the constitutional
right announced in Roe is arguably constitutional common law itself, for it shares
many of the central characteristics of constitutional common law. The liberty of a
woman to decide to terminate her pregnancy is not a right expressed in the Constitu-
tion, but Roe protects a value-the zone of privacy-implicit throughout the Consti-
tution. See text accompanying supra note 56. However, the Court, albeit by narrow
margins, has consistently held that the right announced in Roe is indeed compelled by
the Constitution and has not invited Congress and the states to experiment with the
right, therefore taking the right itself outside the scope of constitutional common law.
See Casey, 505 U.S. at 846-53 (discussing in length how the abortion right is grounded
in the notion of liberty vindicated by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment).
132. Casey, 505 U.S. at 869.
133. Roe, 410 U.S. at 164-65.
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(a) For the stage prior to approximately the end of the first tri-
mester, the abortion decision and its effectuation must be left to
the medical judgment of the pregnant woman's attending
physician.
(b) For the stage subsequent to approximately the end of the
first trimester, the State, in promoting its interest in the health
of the mother, may, if it chooses, regulate the abortion proce-
dure in ways that are reasonably related to maternal health.
(c) For the stage subsequent to viability, the State in promoting
its interest in the potentiality of human life may, if it chooses,
regulate, and even proscribe, abortion except where it is neces-
sary, in appropriate medical judgment, for the preservation of
the life or health of the mother.
134
Thus, the Court framed and imposed on the state and federal gov-
ernments a "rigid ' 13 set of bright line rules, which it justified as
"consistent with the relative weights of the respective interests in-
volved, with the lessons and examples of medical and legal history,
with the lenity of the common law, and with the demands of the
profound problems of the present day." '36 The trimester frame-
work, as drawn by the Roe Court, defeated a more particularized
inquiry. 137 The Court also has done just this with conventional con-
stitutional law, but this, perhaps, it is not problematic. For exam-
ple, Professor Monaghan cites the Court's specific rules
enumerated in its procedural due process cases. In this line of
cases, the Court designed bright line rules to relieve the reviewing
court from conducting an intensive analysis to determine whether
the constitutional right to a fair hearing has been violated in the
case at bar.138 However, the Court generally lays down bright line
134. Id. The Court, in a joint plurality opinion, later scrapped the trimester ap-
proach of Roe and substituted a more factually intensive inquiry that looked to
whether a regulation placed an undue burden on the abortion right. Casey, 505 U.S. at
872.
135. Casey, 505 U.S. at 872.
136. Roe, 410 U.S. at 165.
137. Cf. Monaghan, supra note 17, at 32 (arguing that the Miranda rules are de-
signed to thwart a more particularized inquiry, and citing also the specific rules in the
Court's procedural due process cases and the per se rules in antitrust law). For a
discussion of why the Court condemns certain restraints on trade per se, see text ac-
companying infra note 139.
138. Monaghan, supra note 17, at 32. "[T]he Due Process Clause provides that cer-
tain substantive rights-life, liberty, and property-cannot be deprived except pursu-
ant to constitutionally adequate procedures." Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill,
470 U.S. 532, 541 (1984) (discussing what due process compels in hearings pursuant to
the termination of the employment of public employees). Once the Due Process
Clause of either the Fifth or the Fourteenth Amendment is deemed to apply, "the
question remains what process is due." Id. The Court has called the following some of
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rules when the weight of experience informs it that the violation at
hand is so egregious that a case-by-case assessment of the facts in-
variably will reveal a violation. 139 At the time Roe was decided,
there simply could not have been a weight of experience indicating
that a case-by-case assessment of the effect of a state regulation on
the woman's protected liberty interest invariably would reveal that
the type of regulation under review infringed on her liberty inter-
est. That particular liberty interest had only just been recognized
in Roe.
Also, there is no indication in the opinion why the Roe Court
chose not to adopt the totality of the circumstances approach that
is often characteristic of conventional constitutional law. For ex-
ample, the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment directs
that "Congress shall pass no law respecting the establishment of
religion .... ,"14 The Court, in framing the contours of the Clause,
has indicated that the right guaranteed by the Establishment
Clause lies within the realm of personal rights, 141 and has directed
that government acts that have a religious aspect must: (1) have a
secular purpose; (2) have a principal or primary effect that neither
advances nor inhibits religion; and (3) must not foster an excessive
government entanglement with religion.142 Instead of crafting a
catchall bright line rule that will strike down any entanglement of
government with religion, the Court fashioned a rule to guard
the necessary elements of a constitutionally adequate hearing: notice of and opportu-
nity for a hearing, notification of the evidence and witnesses against the person, and
the ability to present the individual's side of the story, Id. at 542-47 (citing Henry J.
Friendly, Some Kind of Hearing, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1267, 1276 (1975)).
139. Cf. State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 10 (1997).
Some types of restraints, however, have such predictable and pernicious an-
ticompetitive effect, and such limited potential for procompetitive benefit,
that they are deemed unlawful per se .... Per se treatment is appropriate
"once experience with a particular kind of restraint enables the Court to
predict with confidence that the rule of reason will condemn it."
Id. (citations omitted).
140. U.S. CONST. amend. I, cl. 1 (prohibiting also laws restricting the free exercise
of religion); see also text accompanying supra note 21.
141. Compare Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 102-03 (1968) (laying down a two-part
test to determine if an individual has standing as a taxpayer to assert Establishment
Clause claims), with Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 (1978) (declining to extend the
benefits of the exclusionary rule to the defendant, the passenger of a vehicle that was
illegally searched, because his Fourth Amendment rights were not violated by the
illegal search of the property of a third party, the driver of the car), and Monaghan,
supra note 17, at 4 ("[Tlhe Court's decisions in the last two Terms have cut the exclu-
sionary rule entirely free from any personal right or necessary remedy approach,
thereby removing the clearest authority for imposing the rule on the states.").
142. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971).
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against the evils the Establishment Clause was designed to pre-
vent,' 4 3 without "throwing out the baby with the bathwater" by
"stilted over-reaction"' 44 to any injection of the religious into pub-
lic life. Thus, the federal courts have tolerated: the national motto
"In God We Trust"; 45 the phrase "One Nation under God" in the
Pledge of Allegiance; 146 the City of New York sending public
school teachers into religious schools during regular school hours
to provide remedial education;147 laws directing that stores close on
Sunday;48 and the use of the Twelve Steps 149 of the Alcoholics
Anonymous program in state-funded facilities. 5 °
An analysis of the Court's jurisprudence regarding government
regulation of commercial speech reveals a similar pattern. Instead
of crafting bright line rules universally upholding or condemning
government regulation of commercial speech, the Court estab-
lished a four-part test to apply to the particular facts of the case to
determine whether the expression regulated is protected by the
First Amendment:
[The questioned regulation] at least must concern lawful activity
and not be misleading. Next, we ask whether the asserted gov-
ernmental interest is substantial. If both inquiries yield positive
143. Id. at 612.
144. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 686 (1984) (holding that the religious creche
in question did not offend the Establishment Clause).
145. County of Allegheny v. Am. Civil Liberties Union Greater Pittsburgh Chap-
ter, 492 U.S. 573, 602 (1989) (citing Lynch, 465 U.S. at 693).
146. Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 602.
147. Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203 (1997) (overruling Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S.
402 (1985), a case that struck down the very law that Agostini upheld on the same set
of facts).
148. McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961).
149. DeStefano v. Miller, 67 F. Supp. 2d 274, 277 n.3 (S.D.N.Y. 1999).
150. Id. at 287-88 (stating that the mere presence of Alcoholics Anonymous
("AA") meetings in state-funded facilities does not, by itself, offend the Constitu-
tion). The AA cases revealed that the AA program constitutes religious activity/in-
doctrination for the purposes of the Establishment Clause, but that it is compulsion
by the state to participate in AA that offends the Constitution. E.g., Warner v. Or-
ange County Dep't of Probation, 115 F.3d 1068, 1075 (2d Cir. 1997) (declaring that
holding out AA as a condition of probation is compulsory and therefore violates the
Constitution); Griffin v. Coughlin, 673 N.E.2d 98 (N.Y. 1996) (holding that AA can-
not be a condition of a prisoner's right to family visits).
Shortly before the printing of this issue of the Fordham Urban Law Journal, the
United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed DeStefano in part and
remanded the case to the District Court. The Circuit has added a second prong to the
analysis: indoctrination. DeStefano v. Emergency Hous. Group, Inc., Docket No. 99-
9146, 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 7357 (2d Cir. Apr. 20, 2001). Therefore, holding AA
meetings in state-funded facilities will not offend the Constitution unless state em-
ployees compel clients to attend AA or indoctrinate them into the AA program.
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answers, we must determine whether the regulation directly ad-
vances the governmental interest asserted, and whether it is not
more extensive than is necessary to serve that interest. 151
Contrast the three-part Establishment Clause test and the four-
part commercial speech test (what Monaghan would label conven-
tional constitutional law), with the trimester framework and the
Wade-Gilbert bright line rule 152 that forbids corporeal, post-indict-
ment line-ups of criminal defendants conducted in the absence of
defense counsel.153 The former sets of rules determine, through a
fact-intensive analysis of the particulars of the case, if rights an-
nounced in the Constitution-religious and free speech concerns-
have been violated. The latter two sets of rules protect values im-
plicit in the text (privacy), or safeguard underlying constitutional
rights (effective representation of counsel), via rules ignoring the
particulars of the given case. Whether the use of a line-up in viola-
tion of the bright line Wade-Gilbert rule actually would deny the
criminal defendant effective representation of counsel at trial is not
a concern of a reviewing court; the absence of counsel at the line-
up itself is enough to trigger the violation.1 54 However, the mere
presence of a regulation stifling some aspect of commercial speech
may not be sufficient to render the regulation a constitutional vio-
lation; the reviewing court must look to the specifics of the regula-
tion, its purpose, the speech regulated, and its nature. 155
Although the Court later abandoned the trimester framework of
Roe in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v.
Casey'56 and replaced that rule with a totality of the circumstances,
151. E.g., Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 566
(1980).
152. For a fuller discussion of the Wade-Gilbert rule and its place within
Monaghan's theory, see infra Part I.D.3.
153. United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 236-37 (1967) (declaring that, in order for
the Sixth Amendment right to counsel to remain effective, in-court identifications of
criminal defendants would not be permitted if the defendant was presented to the
witness prior to trial in the absence of defense counsel); Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S.
263, 273 (1967).
154. Gilbert, 388 U.S. at 273.
155. E.g., Young v. Am. Mini Theaters, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 70-71 (1976) (holding that
the state may legitimately use the content of pornographic films as the basis for plac-
ing them in a different classification from other motion pictures). "But few of us
would march our sons and daughters off to war to preserve the citizen's right to see
'Specified Sexual Activities' exhibited in the theaters of our choice." Id. at 70. Contra
id. at 85-86 (Stewart, J., dissenting) ("[T]he Court rides roughshod over cardinal prin-
ciples of First Amendment law, which require that time, place and manner regulations
that affect protected expression be content neutral . . .
156. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
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case-by-case assessment, 57 the Roe approach, and rules such as the
Wade-Gilbert rules, demonstrate this second key characteristic
shared by much constitutional common law-a reliance on bright
line rules.
3. Legislative Power to Overrule
Another characteristic of constitutional common law is the
power of legislatures at the state and federal levels to overrule the
constitutional common law of the Supreme Court by statute. 158
Though the Court has not often invited the legislatures to overrule
its common law touching upon the Constitution, nor even indicated
which portions of its opinion are subject to legislative reversal,'159 a
meaningful discussion can be gleaned from the cases indicating that
there is a indeed "[a] line between the basic rights authoritatively
declared to inhere in the Constitution and the formulation of their
specific and admittedly variable components. '160
For example, in Gilbert v. California,16t Justice Brennan, writing
for the Court, declared that, in addition to forbidding in-court
identifications of criminal defendants if the defendant was exhib-
ited to the witness before trial in the absence of defense counsel, 162
the Court also would prevent identifications resulting from this
type of defective line-up from themselves being introduced as evi-
dence. 163 As with Fourth Amendment violations, the Court crafted
a judicially mandated remedy: per se exclusion. 164
157. Id. at 874 (replacing the rigid trimester framework with a case-by-case assess-
ment of whether an abortion regulation places an undue burden on the abortion
right).
158. Monaghan, supra note 17, at 2.
159. Id. at 31.
160. Id. at 20.
161. 388 U.S. 263 (1967).
162. United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967) (rejecting these in-court identifica-
tions unless proven to be derived from a source independent of the line-up tainted by
the absence of defense counsel).
163. Gilbert, 388 U.S. at 273.
164. Id. at 273. "Only a per se exclusionary rule as to such testimony can be an
effective sanction to assure that law enforcement authorities will respect the accused's
constitutional right to the presence of his counsel at the critical lineup." Id. Thus, the
Gilbert rule shares the other characteristics of constitutional common law. It is a
bright line rule that does not provide for an analysis of whether introduction of the
tainted evidence will actually deny the defendant a fair trial. In addition, the Gilbert
rule serves as a judicially created safeguard grounded in deterring violations of the
underlying Sixth Amendment right. Cf supra Part I.D.1.
In 1972, the Supreme Court limited the scope of the Wade-Gilbert exclusionary rule
by declining to extend its reach to identification testimony based on a suspect lineup
that took place before the government indicted or charged the defendant with any
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Professor Monaghan dubbed this framing of a prophylactic im-
plementing rule "a traditional judicial function," which protected
the civil liberties of the accused by providing clear guidance to
those in the position to violate those liberties.165 Although this
function is a traditional one, formulating this rule and justifying it
does not explain: (1) why this bright line rule is compulsory on the
states; (2) why it must supersede a case-by-case assessment of the
fairness of introducing the identification evidence at trial; or (3)
why the Court "may insist upon a particular form of a rule among
the several that might provide protection for the underlying consti-
tutional right. 166
Justice Brennan's Gilbert opinion, however, implicitly invited the
federal and state legislatures to substitute their judgments for the
Court's rule: "In the absence of legislative regulations adequate to
avoid the hazards to a fair trial which inhere in lineups as presently
conducted, the desirability of deterring the constitutionally objec-
tionable practice must prevail over the undesirability of excluding
relevant evidence."' 67 For those jurisdictions that took up Justice
Brennan on his "offer," the question thus remained: is the legisla-
tive substitution of the Court's judgment adequate to safeguard the
underlying right that so concerned the Gilbert Court? 161
Still, it is worth questioning the very invitation itself: why defer
to the legislatures regarding a rule derived from the Constitution
crime. Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682 (1972) (plurality opinion). The plurality
grounded its decision in the long line of Supreme Court cases that "firmly established
that a person's Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment right to counsel attaches only at or
after the time that adversary judicial proceedings have been initiated against him."
Kirby, 406 U.S. at 688-89 (citations omitted). However, the Kirby Court insisted that
the Due Process Clause of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments remains a critical
stopgap to "forbid[ ] a lineup that is unnecessarily suggestive and conducive to irrepa-
rable mistaken identification." Kirby, 406 U.S. at 691 (citations omitted).
165. Monaghan, supra note 17, at 20-21.
166. Id. at 21.
167. Gilbert, 388 U.S. at 273.
168. Indeed, many scholars thought the Court's decision in Dickerson would turn
on whether 18 U.S.C. § 3501 amounted to the adequate alternative safeguards called
for by Miranda. See infra Part III. The Dickerson Court, in addition to deciding the
larger issue of whether Congress could even supersede Miranda, also decided this
narrower issue, concluding that § 3501 did not constitute an adequate alternative safe-
guard. Dickerson v. United States, 120 S. Ct. 2326, 2335 (2000).
The Court's deciding both issues in Dickerson is at odds with prudential practice,
for the Court usually will avoid invoking the Constitution in cases in which the Jus-
tices can resolve the controversy without resort to constitutional interpretation. See,
e.g., Friendly, supra note 71, at 390-91 (defending Justice Brandeis from criticism that
he needlessly invoked the Constitution in Erie because statutory analysis sufficed to
overrule Swift v. Tyson).
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when the Court itself is the "singularly appropriate institution to
fashion many of the details as well as the framework of the consti-
tutional guarantees? ' 169 The answer seems to be that the Court, in
placing a gloss on the right to counsel guaranteed by the Sixth
Amendment, declined to treat the Gilbert rule as a necessary di-
mension of the underlying constitutional right that the rule was de-
signed to safeguard. 7 ° This may be contrasted with conventional
constitutional law rules such as the limitation on the use of confes-
sions running afoul of due process, which is an exclusion even the
most conservative Justices feel is necessary to prevent a constitu-
tional violation. 7' In its line of cases excluding involuntary confes-
sions under due process analysis, the Court never has invited the
legislatures to supersede its judgment, 72 because the Supreme
Court is the ultimate arbiter of what comports with the Constitu-
tion, due to its appellate jurisdiction over federal and state court
judgments.173 Thus, Justice Brennan's invitation in Gilbert174 seem-
ingly stands at odds with the Marbury-Cooper tradition that the
Supreme Court is "supreme in the exposition of the law of the
Constitution." 75
The way to reconcile Gilbert's invitation to the legislatures with
the sweeping language in the expositions on federal judicial power
contained in Marbury and Cooper is to recognize Gilbert for what
it is: a prophylactic and subconstitutional rule, distinct perhaps only
in degree from the constitutional exegesis of Marbury and
Cooper-in other words, constitutional common law.
169. Monaghan, supra note 17, at 19.
170. Cf id. at 22 (questioning whether the Court in Miranda, another case where
the Court invited the states and Congress to substitute their adequate judgments for
that of the Court, had the power to impose the rule on the states "where it [was]
unwilling to treat the prophylactic implementing rule as a necessary dimension of an
underlying constitutional right"); see also United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 905-06
(1984) (implying that the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule is not a necessary
corollary to the Amendment itself).
171. See Dickerson, 120 S. Ct. at 2347 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
172. Cf. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997) (holding that Congress could
not supersede by statute a constitutional decision of the court construing the Free
Exercise Clause of the First Amendment).
173. See cases discussed supra notes 39, 48, and 74 and accompanying text.
174. Supra Part I.A.
175. Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 18 (1958) (per curiam).
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E. Constitutional Common Law: Does It Square With
Federalism and Separation of Powers?
The previous discussion raised the problem of reconciling consti-
tutional common law with the constitutional doctrines of federal-
ism and separation of powers. In essence, how can the Court
genuinely police its constitutional common law precedent while in-
sisting in one set of cases that the federal and state courts adhere to
a rule of law not mandated by the Constitution,176 and in others
instructing that the federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction,
non-supervisory, and powerless to act outside the scope of the
powers articulated in Article III?177
The theory of constitutional common law, as described by Pro-
fessor Monaghan, contains, within its own formulations, limitations
that blunt some of the criticism that constitutional common law is
extraconstitutional law that violates wholesale both federalism and
separation of powers principles.
1. Separation of Powers Concerns Vis-d-Vis Congress
Constitutional common law is least troublesome when Congress
is the other federal branch considered in the separation of powers
inquiry.178 Constitutional common law, by its very nature, is sub-
ject to alteration and outright reversal by Congress,1 79 as seen ex-
plicitly in Gilbert'80 and implicitly in United States v. Leon.181
Should Congress deem the Supreme Court to have overstepped its
authority in crafting a rule of law not mandated by the Constitu-
tion, then Congress, pursuant to its Article I power,' 82 and fully
176. Compare United States v. Leon, 486 U.S. 897, 905-06 (1984) (stating that ex-
clusion is not mandated by the Fourth Amendment), with Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643,
655-56 (1961) (indicating that due process principles compel exclusion of evidence
obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment).
177. E.g., Aldinger v. Howard, 427 U.S. 1, 15 (1976); Mu'Min v. Virginia, 500 U.S.
415, 422 (1991).
178. See Monaghan, supra note 17, at 34.
179. Id.
180. Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263, 273 (1967) (inviting state and federal legis-
latures to substitute their own regulations adequate to avoid jeopardizing the right to
a fair trial inherent in conducting police line-ups without the presence of defense
counsel).
181. Leon, 468 U.S. at 905-06 (implying that the opinions of the Court may have
implied that the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule is a necessary corollary of, and
is required by, the text, but insisting that "[t]hese implications need not detain us
long").
182. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1 ("All legislative powers herein granted shall be vested
in a Congress of the United States ... ").
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consistent with the Marbury tradition, can substitute its own judg-
ment for that of the nine Justices. 183
2. Separation of Powers Concerns Vis-d-Vis the
Executive Branch
The collision of constitutional common law and separation of
powers principles is more troublesome, however, when the Court is
imposing its will upon the federal executive branch. As Professor
Monaghan noted in 1975, our federal judiciary did not inherit the
English tradition of constraining the executive branch by fashion-
ing judicial rules subject to the ultimate authority of Parliament.184
Indeed, an unrestrained, general judicial power to pass judgment
on the exact methods the executive uses to enforce the penal laws,
for example, clearly would violate separation of powers princi-
ples.185 However, constitutional common law still can find a valid
niche in the established constitutional order. Monaghan argued
that constitutional common law exists as a form of limited judicial
lawmaking power designed solely to vindicate existing constitu-
tional rights, that "[v]indication of these rights has been a tradi-
tional function of judicial review," and that constitutional common
law, by its very nature, is law that protects rights and values de-
rived from the text.1 86 Thus, Monaghan concluded, the theory
faces some criticism in this area, but this criticism is not insur-
mountable, because constitutional common law does not imply a
"free-wheeling power" of the federal judiciary to impose its will on
the executive branch. 187
3. Infringement on State Sovereignty: Federalism Concerns
Constitutional common law faces a similar criticism for extracon-
stitutional judicial encroachment in that it presupposes that the
federal judiciary may impose its will upon matters of state concern
in violation of the Erie Doctrine's reigning maxim that federal law
has only limited power to displace state law.' 88 Much of constitu-
tional common law goes beyond areas of primary national legisla-
183. Monaghan, supra note 17, at 34.
184. Id. (citing Alfred Hill, The Bill of Rights and the Supervisory Power, 69
COLUM. L. REV. 181, 208 (1969)).
185. Monaghan, supra note 17, at 34; cf. Dickerson v. United States, 120 S. Ct. 2326,
2348 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (decrying the Court's displacement of how Congress chose
to regulate confessions in federal court).
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tive competence, where the usual question is whether the federal
displacement of state law survives preemption analysis-it delves
into the reserved powers of the states and assumes for the Supreme
Court the power to formulate its own implementing rules without
regard to whether the displaced state law was "minimally
adequate."' 8 9
There are several responses to the federalism concerns, one of
which argues that the Court's power to fashion rules to protect an
underlying constitutional right or value is a necessary corollary of
the power granted by Article III and Marbury to decide ultimately
what limits the Constitution places on the state and federal govern-
ments.190 According to this argument, if the Supreme Court is the
ultimate authority on what types of government acts will render a
confession involuntary under due process analysis, 191 then it is also
the most competent institution to "formulate a coherent, cohesive
substructure of implementing rules,"' 92 including which pretrial
acts (e.g., police line-ups in the absence of defense counsel' 93 ) by
law enforcement will ultimately impair an accused's right to a fair
trial.
In addition, Professor Monaghan suggested that the Court
crafted a large part of its constitutional common law-its Fourth,
Fifth, and Sixth Amendment implementing rules governing the ex-
clusion of defective evidence,'194 confessions, 195 and line-up identifi-
cations196-because the states' legislatures had failed to enact their
own adequate rules regulating searches, seizures, line-ups, and in-
terrogation. 197 When Professor Monaghan wrote Constitutional
Common Law, the Court had not yet confronted a specific, clearly
articulated state law displacing any part of this large subset of con-
stitutional common law.1 98 In essence, the Court, in the legislative
189. Id.
190. Id. at 36.
191. See, e.g., Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385 (1978); Spano v. New York, 360 U.S.
315 (1959); Fikes v. Alabama, 352 U.S. 191 (1957); Colorado v. Connolly, 479 U.S. 157
(1986) (indicating that the due process inquiry into the voluntariness of a confession
should focus primarily on police misconduct and not what the suspect was thinking).
192. Monaghan, supra note 17, at 36.
193. United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967); Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263
(1967).
194. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
195. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
196. United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967); Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263
(1967).
197. Monaghan, supra note 17, at 36; Miranda, 384 U.S. at 467-73, 476-77; Gilbert,
388 U.S. at 273.
198. Monaghan, supra note 17, at 36.
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vacuum of the 1950s and 1960s, could not be faulted for "taking the
reins" in developing its rules of exclusion. 199 In addition, states ag-
grieved by any overreaching aspect of the Supreme Court's consti-
tutional common law have a forum in which to seek redress200 _
Congress, which retains the power to amend or reverse constitu-
tional common law.20'
Finally, the federalism concerns are muted by looking to the con-
stitutional common law itself. The United States Constitution
prescribes minimum guaranteed protections-states may exceed in
their own laws the scope of the protections granted, but may not
provide less protection. 2  With constitutional common law, the
Court sets the floor below which the states cannot go, in the hope
that the states will adopt and implement the rule-ultimately, the
Court proscribes "something that works," while the states are left
with the choice to decide what fulfills that minimum "something
that works" standard.20 3 The Court, in reviewing such a state adop-
tion/implementation can then adopt any state measure that goes
beyond that bare minimum standard,0 4 which is wholly consistent
with that oft-repeated principle of federalism that the states serve
as the national laboratories for experimenting with individual
rights.20 5
199. For a fascinating example of a court acting, though very reluctantly, in re-
sponse to the perceived complete derogation of responsibility by the state legislature,
see Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel, 336 A.2d 713
(N.J. 1975) [Mount Laurel I] (directing that developing municipalities have a pre-
sumptive obligation, via their land use regulations, to plan and provide for the reason-
able opportunity for an appropriate variety and choice of housing, including low and
moderate cost housing, to meet the needs, desires, and resources of all categories of
peoples who may desire to live in the municipality). When the municipalities and state
legislature in New Jersey essentially ignored Mount Laurel I, the state Supreme
Court, in an expansive 216 page opinion, extended the Mount Laurel obligation to all
municipalities in the state and created a special court to hear Mount Laurel claims to
ensure not only that its will was followed, but followed uniformly. Southern Burling-
ton County NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel, 456 A.2d 390 (N.J. 1983) [Mount
Laurel II].
200. Monaghan, supra note 17, at 36-37.
201. See supra Part I.D.3.
202. E.g., Commonwealth v. Matos, 672 A.2d 769, 774 n.7 (Pa. 1996).
203. Monaghan, supra note 17, at 37.
204. Id. at 37-38.
205. Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1, 8 (1995) (citing New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann,
285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (urging that the Court not impose
federal constitutional restraints on the efforts of a State to "serve as a laboratory")).
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a. Federalism Concerns and Field Preemption
Constitutional common law also may draw considerable federal-
ism fire when viewed as a subconstitutional body of law force-fed
to the states in areas of both state and national concern, but where
there remains no substantial conflict between federal and state
law. °6 Fully consistent with Erie, and limited by the scope of the
grant of power in Article I, Congress may displace completely state
laws in areas of truly national concern, so that state courts are pre-
vented from asserting jurisdiction in the field.20 7 Although the Su-
preme Court is the ultimate arbiter of what comports with the
Constitution, state courts are duty-bound to faithfully interpret the
Constitution20 8 and to devise schemes for the protection of consti-
tutional rights.20 9 Therefore, this type of "field" preemption should
not apply to state court remedies for constitutional violations, be-
cause of the local as well as national concerns involved.
b. Federalism Concerns and Conflict Preemption
When the Court concludes that Congress did not intend to oc-
cupy the entire field, the propriety of compelling application of a
federal law that conflicts with a state law turns on the question of
whether the purpose embodied in the federal statute requires state
law to be subordinated.2 1 When the inquiry into the statute-
looking to its legislative history, structure, and the need for a uni-
form national solution-indicates that application of a state law
would frustrate congressional intent, the Court will subordinate the
state law.2 1' The "conflict" preempts the state law in favor of the
federal law.
This background of statutory preemption analysis may create
problems for constitutional common law theory because of the
206. Monaghan, supra note 17, at 11-14.
207. E.g., State v. McHorse, 517 P.2d 75,79 (N.M. Ct. App. 1973) (rejecting a crimi-
nal defendant's assertions that federal postal and controlled substances laws pre-
empted a state prosecution on drug distribution charges).
208. E.g., Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 346 (1816) ("[S]tate
judges are bound by an oath to support the constitution of the United States .... ").
209. Cf. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467 (1966) (inviting the states to substi-
tute adequate safeguards to the remedies imposed, which the Court felt were neces-
sary to vindicate the underlying Fifth Amendment right); Monaghan, supra note 17, at
8. ("Even if the fourth amendment imposes a general obligation on the state to deter
future fourth amendment violations, there appears to be no basis for the Court to
impose its judgment to void ... an attempt by the state legislature to provide a spe-
cific system for control of state officers.").
210. Monaghan, supra note 17, at 12 (citation omitted).
211. Id.
1273
FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL [Vol. XXVIII
aforementioned mutable nature of constitutional common law.
Congress and the states have the power to modify and overrule the
Court's constitutional common law212 -the invitations to the legis-
latures in Miranda213 and Gilbert2 4 illustrate this point. Yet ordi-
narily, once federal law preempts state law, whether through field
preemption or conflict preemption analysis, the state law has no
effect because of the primacy of federal law under the Supremacy
Clause.215 Thus, we are left with the unresolved question of why
states are free to legislate in one particular area of primary federal
competence (the dictates of the Constitution), but not in others,
such as copyright protection.2 16
The sting in this criticism of constitutional common law may not
be as troublesome as it may appear. The analogy to statutory pre-
emption analysis remains flawed, because the U.S. Constitution is a
document different in kind from all lesser federal law, and, there-
fore, the analogy can never be wholly satisfactory. Although this
"apples and oranges" argument may not convince the skeptics, an-
other argument previously mentioned might blunt further these
federalism concerns with respect to state abrogation of constitu-
tional common law. Recall that when Monaghan wrote Constitu-
tional Common Law, no case had yet presented the Supreme Court
with a state law wholly conflicting with the Court's Fourth, Fifth,
and Sixth Amendment implementing rules, and that the Court
hardly could be faulted for acting in a legislative vacuum to protect
the underlying constitutional rights.217 Ultimately, Professor
Monaghan's theory of constitutional common law squares with the
212. Id. at 34 (noting Congress's power to supersede the Court's judgment in this
area). "[T]he revisionary role of Congress provides a forum in which state interests
may be recognized and the Court reversed . . . ." Id. at 36.
213. For a fuller discussion of Miranda v. Arizona and Chief Justice Warren's invi-
tation to the states and Congress to legislate in the area of police custodial interroga-
tion, see supra Part II.A.
214. For a fuller discussion of Gilbert, its exclusionary rule, and Justice Brennan's
implicit invitation to the states and Congress to regulate police lineup identifications,
see supra Part I.D.3.
215. See, e.g., Lawrence County v. Lead-Deadwood Sch. Dist. No. 40-1, 469 U.S.
256, 260 (1985) ("Even if Congress has not expressly pre-empted state law in a given
area, a state statute may nevertheless be invalid under the Supremacy Clause if it
conflicts with federal law or 'stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment of the full
purposes and objectives of Congress.'") (citation omitted).
216. E.g., Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 740 (1989)
("Establishment of a federal rule of agency, rather than reliance on state agency law,
is particularly appropriate here given the [Copyright] Act's express objective of creat-
ing national, uniform copyright law by broadly pre-empting state statutory and com-
mon-law copyright regulation.") (citing 17 U.S.C. § 301(a) (1994)).
217. See supra notes 198-199 and accompanying text.
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doctrine of federalism because, if presented with a state court deci-
sion substituting substantial monetary compensation, for example,
for the exclusionary rule the Court created to remedy a Fourth
Amendment violation, the Court likely would uphold the state
court judgment,218 or be forced to anchor exclusion closer to the
Fourth Amendment itself. Either result is fully consistent with pre-
emption analysis's refusal to displace state law that does not con-
flict with federal law.
II. You HAVE THE RIGHT To REMAIN OF AN INDETERMINATE
CONSTITUTIONAL STATUS: MIRANDA V. ARIZONA AND
ITS PROGENY
In 1966, Chief Justice Warren announced for the Court an opin-
ion he deemed as going "to the roots of our concepts of American
criminal jurisprudence: the restraints society must observe consis-
tent with the federal Constitution in prosecuting individuals for
crime. ' '2 19 Specifically, the Miranda Court addressed the propriety
of admitting confessions given by criminal suspects within the con-
fines of the police station house in light of the Fifth Amendment,
which directs that "[n]o person.., shall be compelled in any crimi-
nal case to be a witness against himself. '220
A. Miranda v. Arizona
Before Miranda, the Court had used the Sixth Amendment right
to counsel as a basis for excluding tainted confessions, 221 but the
Sixth Amendment, by its terms,222 applies to criminal prosecutions,
leaving unclear whether the Constitution regulated the investiga-
tional stage, during which most confessions actually occur.223 The
Miranda Court was animated by the concern that the admission of
a station house confession in court was tantamount to compelling a
defendant to testify against himself.
218. Cf. Monaghan, supra note 17, at 6-8 (delivering a hypothetical opinion of a
state high court refusing to exclude evidence because of an adequate alternative, and
setting forth the author's doubts as to whether the Supreme Court on review could
insist on exclusion). Contra Dickerson v. United States, 120 S. Ct. 2326 (2000) (strik-
ing down a federal law that attempted to supersede an exclusionary rule of the
Court).
219. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 439.
220. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
221. Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201 (1964); Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S.
478 (1964).
222. U.S. CONST. amend. VI ("In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy
the right ... to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence.").
223. SALTZBURG & CAPRA, supra note 24, at 527.
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1. A Simple Formula: Custody + Interrogation = Coercion
At the outset, the Miranda Court established precisely what it
was attempting to regulate: "incommunicado interrogation of indi-
viduals in a police-dominated atmosphere, resulting in self-incrimi-
nating statements without full warnings of constitutional rights. '224
To the Court, interrogations conducted in the privacy of the inter-
rogation room, using psychological pressures like confidence of the
suspect's guilt22 5 or outright hostility,226 exacted a heavy toll on in-
dividual liberties, 7 thus persuading the Court to declare that the
combination of police custody and interrogation is presumptively
compulsive. 2 8 Absent adequate protective devices to dispel the
compulsion inherent in the custodial surrounding of the police sta-
tion house, "no statement obtained from the defendant can truly
be the product of his free choice, 2 29 from which the Court rea-
soned that such confessions must be per se inadmissible.
2. The "Miranda Rights"
Having declared these rules of per se coercion and exclusion, the
Court then set forth the famous four warnings law enforcement
officials must administer to overcome this newly established pre-
sumption. First, the suspect has to be informed unequivocally that
he has a right to remain silent.2 30 The Court established this warn-
ing as "an absolute prerequisite in overcoming the inherent pres-
sures" of the custodial interrogation.23' This first warning must be
accompanied by a second warning that anything the suspect then
chooses to say can be used against him in court.232 Third, the Court
imposed a warning regarding the right to have counsel present dur-
ing the interrogation. 233 The Chief Justice insisted that the pres-
ence of counsel is indispensable to the protection of the Fifth
Amendment privilege announced by the Court,234 and therefore
deemed both the giving of the warning and the knowing and effec-
224. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 445.
225. Id. at 450.
226. Id. at 452.
227. Id. at 455.
228. Id. at 461 ("An individual ... cannot be otherwise than under compulsion to
speak.") (emphasis added).
229. Id. at 458.
230. Id. at 467-68.
231. Id. at 468.
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tive waiver of the right contained therein absolute prerequisites to
the admissibility of the station house confession. 35 Finally, the Mi-
randa Court imposed the rule that suspects have to be warned that
if they are indigent, counsel will be appointed for them. 36
However, in introducing the four warnings, the Chief Justice set
forth one of the more troubling parts of the opinion. After declar-
ing adequate protective devices an absolute necessity for overcom-
ing the presumption of compulsion, Warren continued: "It is
impossible for us to foresee the potential alternatives for protecting
the privilege which might be devised by Congress and the States in
the exercise of their creative rule-making capacities. ''2 3 Thus, Mi-
randa did not go so far as to preclude alternatives to the safeguards
then declared by the Court. In fact, the majority invited interven-
tion by the states and Congress. However, until such time, law en-
forcement at both the state and federal levels had to comply with
the four warnings requirement or face per se exclusion of any sub-
sequent statement:
Our decision in no way creates a constitutional straitjacket which
will handicap sound efforts at reform, nor is it intended to have
this effect. We encourage Congress and the States to continue
their laudable search for increasingly effective ways of protect-
ing the rights of the individual while promoting efficient en-
forcement of our criminal laws.23 8
However equivocal, this hedging of the constitutional nature of
the Miranda warnings is of great import, for subsequent Courts
under Chief Justices Burger and Rehnquist often referred to this
very passage in their efforts to limit the breadth of the Miranda
decision. 39
B. Post-Miranda: Backtracking on the Implications of the
Four Warnings Requirement
The Supreme Court did not wait long before placing real limits
on the holding of Miranda.
235. Id. at 471.
236. Id. at 472 ("The financial ability of the individual has no relationship to the
scope of the rights involved here. The privilege against self-incrimination secured by
the Constitution applies to all individuals.").
237. Id. at 467.
238. Id. (emphasis added).
239. E.g., Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 444 (1974) (citation omitted) ("The
suggested safeguards were not intended to 'create a constitutional straitjacket' . . . but
rather to provide practical reinforcement for the right against compulsory self-
incrimination.").
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1. Harris v. New York 2 40
In Harris v. New York, Chief Justice Burger, writing for the
Court, held that a confession obtained in violation of Miranda's
technical requirements could be used to impeach a defendant's di-
rect testimony.241 The Harris majority, in declaring that the Mi-
randa safeguards are not required by the Constitution, stated:
Some comments in the Miranda opinion can indeed be read
as indicating a bar to use of an uncounseled statement for any
purpose, but discussion of that issue was not at all necessary to
the Court's holding and cannot be regarded as controlling ....
Assuming that the exclusionary rule has a deterrent effect on
proscribed police conduct, sufficient deterrence flows when the
evidence in question is made unavailable to the prosecution in
its case in chief.24
2
Recall that around this same time in the early 1970s, the Su-
preme Court, in decisions such as Peltier243 and Calandra,244 began
to rid the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule of the personal
rights approach underlying that rule in cases like Mapp v. Ohio.245
Harris shows the parallel track the Court started on regarding a
personal rights approach to the Miranda exclusionary rule. Far
from indicating an absolute bar to impeachment-as the Court
later imposed for the use of confessions running afoul of the due
process24 6-the Harris Court began reining in considerably the
scope of the Miranda exclusionary rule by shifting the focus from
vindicating the rights of the criminal suspect to deterring police
misconduct.247
By permitting the admission of a Miranda-defective confession
to impeach, Harris placed criminal defendants in a unenviable po-
sition: not testifying at all (and risking any negative inferences the
jury may draw from this) or testifying and facing guaranteed im-
peachment with a Miranda-defective confession. Despite an in-
struction to the contrary, juries often use evidence offered to
impeach as substantive proof beyond the impeachment value of the
240. 401 U.S. 222 (1971).
241. Id. at 226.
242. Id. at 224-25 (emphasis added).
243. 422 U.S. 531 (1975).
244. 414 U.S. 338 (1974).
245. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
246. Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385 (1978).
247. Harris, 401 U.S. at 225.
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evidence.248 Instructing jurors to ignore the substantive value of
the evidence merely draws attention to the evidence and keeps it in
their minds, like "the story, by Mark Twain, of the boy told to
stand in the corner and not think of a white elephant. ' 249 How-
ever, by beginning to focus its Miranda analysis on policies of de-
terrence, the Court simply did not implicate the Constitution in the
defendant's difficult choice.
Although the Miranda decision may have left the rights therein
enumerated in constitutional limbo, Harris shows the Court shift-
ing Miranda down the spectrum from a necessary corollary to the
underlying Fifth Amendment right to more of a prophylactic safe-
guard of that underlying right. Later Courts would rely heavily on
Harris's reading of Miranda to further constrain the scope of the
remedial power announced in Chief Justice Warren's opinion.
2. Michigan v. Tucker250
Three years after Harris, in Michigan v. Tucker, the Burger
Court indicated it intended to remain on the course set by Harris-
narrowing the scope of just what Miranda protected and when. In
Tucker, the Court addressed the question of whether to admit evi-
dence obtained by the government as a result of a Miranda-defec-
tive confession.25 1 The Tucker Court held that the then-familiar
Miranda directed that the defendant's confession itself must be ex-
cluded from the prosecution's case-in-chief, but that Miranda
would not necessarily act as a constitutional bar to the admission of
the evidence obtained as the fruit of the defective confession.252
Justice Rehnquist, writing for the Court, continued the hedging
of Miranda started in Harris, and greatly undercut the constitu-
tional status of the Miranda rights by declaring them "not them-
selves rights protected by the Constitution. ' 253  Instead, the
warnings served as procedural safeguards, certain measures law en-
forcement should follow to insure adequate protection for the un-
derlying right against compulsory self-incrimination. 254 The Tucker
248. Courts will often instruct jurors that they are limited to using the evidence
only for the purpose for which it was offered-in Harris's case, to impeach his direct
testimony. However, critics have charged that these limiting instructions only draw
attention to the evidence. Cf United States v. Antonelli Fireworks Co., 155 F.2d 631,
656 (2d Cir. 1.946) (Frank, J., dissenting).
249. Id.
250. 417 U.S. 433 (1974).
251. Id. at 435.
252. Id. at 452.
253. Id. at 444.
254. Id.
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Court, relying on Miranda's invitation to Congress and the states to
substitute adequate alternatives for the warnings, declared that
failure to give the four warnings did not alone violate the Constitu-
tion,255 but only departed from the Court's prophylactic stan-
dards.256 Justice Rehnquist's opinion grounded exclusion firmly in
the policy of deterrence-balancing the need to deter egregious
police misconduct with the need to have criminal adjudication
based on all the relevant evidence. 257 As it had concluded similarly
in Harris, the Tucker Court held that sufficient deterrence flowed
from the exclusion of the confession itself, with only minimal addi-
tional deterrence resulting from exclusion of the fruits of Tucker's
confession.258
3. New York v. Quarles259
The Court continued its equivocation of the constitutional status
of Miranda by fashioning another exception to the exclusion of un-
warned confessions in New York v. Quarles. The Quarles Court,
building on the foundations laid in Harris and Tucker that a viola-
tion of the Miranda holding did not necessarily equal a violation of
the Constitution,26 ° declared a "'public safety' exception" to ad-
ministering the Miranda warnings.2 61 "[T]he need for answers to
questions in a situation posing a threat to the public safety out-
weighs the need for the prophylactic rule protecting the Fifth
Amendment's privilege against self-incrimination. '262 The Court
thus extended the deterrence policies discussed in Harris and
Tucker.
Both of those earlier cases stand for the proposition that failure
to give the warnings itself is a "wrong," albeit not one rising to the
level of a constitutional violation, but still a wrong that demands
deterrence, which flows from the exclusion of the confession itself
from the government's case-in-chief. 263 Quarles went beyond this
reasoning in holding that the very failure to provide the warnings
itself may not even amount to a wrong if the exception applied.
Thus, the Court again subverted the famous gloss on the privilege
255. Id. at 445-46.
256. Id.
257. Id. at 447-48.
258. Id. at 448.
259. 467 U.S. 649 (1984).
260. See id. at 654.
261. Id. at 655-56.
262. Id. at 657.
263. For a fuller discussion of Harris and Tucker, see supra Parts II.B.1-2.
1280
2001] DICKERSON & THE IMPERIAL SUPREMES
of self-incrimination to the needs of ordered society, which the
Court previously had stated it would not do with truly involuntary
confessions, the use of which are unconstitutional as violative of
due process, 64
4. Oregon v. Elstad265
In the later Burger years, the Court demonstrated little willing-
ness to reverse its earlier reining in of Miranda, using broad lan-
guage focusing on the mutable nature of the Miranda protections
and the case's uncertain root in the Constitution. In Oregon v. El-
stad, the Court extended its analysis in Tucker regarding the fruits
of a Miranda-defective confession.266
Elstad addressed the admissibility of a confession that complied
with Miranda's technical requirements but was one that resulted
directly from a Miranda-defective confession.267 Rejecting the no-
tion that the second, Miranda-compliant confession was tainted be-
cause "the cat was out of the bag, ' 268 the Elstad Court continued
the undermining of the constitutional status of Miranda that Harris
began in the early Burger years by succinctly stating, "Respon-
dent's contention ... assumes the existence of a constitutional vio-
lation." '269 Justice O'Connor's opinion for the Court emphasized
the procedural (as opposed to substantive) nature of the Miranda
safeguards, and reasoned that since Miranda-defective confessions
are only compulsory due to Miranda's per se presumption regard-
ing custodial interrogation, 7 ° some confessions obtained in viola-
tion of the prophylactic safeguards may be indeed voluntary, a
product of free will. 71 This, O'Connor reasoned, may provide a
remedy for a defendant who has not suffered the very wrong the
Fifth Amendment sought to prevent: compelled self-incrimina-
tion.272 Thus, the exclusionary rule formulated in Miranda "sweeps
264. Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 398 (1978) (distinguishing Harris v. New
York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971)). A concern that animated the Harris Court was that for-
bidding the use of Miranda-defective confessions to impeach a defendant's direct tes-
timony on cross-examination would constitute an open invitation to perjury on a
massive scale. Harris, 401 U.S. at 225-26.
265. 470 U.S. 298 (1985).
266. Id.
267. Id.
268. Id. at 304.
269. Id. at 305.
270. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 461 (1966) ("An individual ... cannot be
otherwise than under compulsion to speak.").
271. Elstad, 470 U.S. at 306-07.
272. Id.
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more broadly than the Fifth Amendment itself," due to this rule
mandating exclusion in the absence of a constitutional violation.273
Detached from a seeming constitutional mandate, the Court then
proceeded to apply the balancing test discussed in Tucker, reaching
the by-now familiar conclusion that the policy of deterrence that
exclusion serves is not advanced so significantly by exclusion of the
second confession to warrant extension of Miranda's exclusionary
rule to the fruits of the first, defective confession.27 4
C. Miranda v. Arizona: If It Looks Like Constitutional
Common Law and Walks Like Constitutional
Common Law, Then...
A review of the factors delineating the differences between con-
stitutional common law and conventional constitutional law reveals
that the Miranda holding is paradigmatic constitutional common
law.275 In fact, much of the original article, Constitutional Common
Law, rested on this very conclusion. 276  Although Professor
Monaghan devised his theory before the Court decided both Elstad
and Quarles, a review of Miranda against the background of all the
cases constraining the scope of its protections vindicates both: (1)
Monaghan's conclusion that Miranda announced a set of subconsti-
tutional rules subject to alteration by Congress and the states; and
(2) the conclusion that such a theory is necessary to explain ade-
quately many modern decisions of the Supreme Court.
First, the Miranda warnings, like the Fourth Amendment exclu-
sionary rule discussed supra, are not constitutionally compelled.
The Miranda majority itself admitted this when it noted that the
Justices were "in no way creat[ing] a constitutional straitjacket. '277
In turn, the Miranda progeny consistently downshifted the Mi-
randa rights into the realm of constitutional common law, calling
the Miranda rights both "not ... rights protected by the Constitu-
tion, ' '278 and mere "procedural safeguards, ' 279 in addition to noting
that failure to administer the warnings did not necessarily violate
273. Id. at 306.
274. Id. at 318.
275. Supra Part I.D.
276. E.g., Monaghan, supra note 17, at 9 n.45 ("But even if the rules are so concep-
tualized, consideration should be given to the source of federal judicial authority to
impose them.").
277. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467 (1966).
278. Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 444 (1974), cited by Oregon v. Elstad, 470
U.S. 298, 305 (1985).
279. Tucker, 417 U.S. at 444.
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the Constitution.2 80 Application of the Miranda exclusionary rule,
like the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule, devolved from a
vindicator of personal rights to a judicially created remedy, the use
of which turns solely on whether application in that category (e.g.,
impeachment of testimony) would further the goal of deterring po-
lice misconduct.28'
Second, the Miranda rules, like other examples constitutional
common law, are bright line rules. As a matter of law, confessions
scrutinized under Miranda are deemed compelled in the absence of
the prescribed warnings. Consider the arrest of Sol Wachtler,
the former Chief Judge of the New York Court of Appeals, which
illustrates the reach of these bright line rules. Chief Judge Wach-
tler, who participated in the review of well over 100 cases involving
Miranda claims during his tenure on New York State's highest
court,283 nonetheless was read the Miranda rights upon his arrest
for blackmailing a former lover.2 84 Wachtler undoubtedly under-
stood, as much as any arrestee before or since, the extent to which
the Constitution afforded him protection. Yet Miranda directs that
even Sol Wachtlers must be given the famous warnings. The Mi-
randa decision, intended to thwart more particularized inquiry,285
did not leave room for analysis of whether, in the particular situa-
tion, the will of the individual, from the most powerful judge in
New York State to the street drug peddler, was overborne. 86
280. Elstad, 470 U.S. at 306-07 n.1.
281. Compare United States v. Ceccolini, 435 U.S. 268, 279-80 (1978) (refusing ap-
plication of the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule, because the cost of exclusion
outweighed its value in deterring police misconduct), with Harris v. New York, 401
U.S. 222, 224-25 (1971) (refusing application of the Miranda exclusionary rule, be-
cause the cost of exclusion outweighed its value in deterring police misconduct).
282. Elstad, 470 U.S. at 307.
283. Wachtler sat on the New York Court of Appeals from his election to that court
in 1972, and elevation to the position of Chief Judge in 1985, until his resignation in
1992. Diana Jean Schemo, A Prison Term of 15 Months For Wachtler, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 10, 1993, at B1. A review of the Shepard's© citation system reveals that the New
York Court of Appeals cited Miranda 150 times during his twenty year tenure-inter-
estingly, the U.S. Supreme Court heard far fewer Miranda cases than that number in
the 34 years since the Miranda decision. Cf Dickerson v. United States, 120 S. Ct.
2326, 2347 (2000) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (denying that the Miranda bright line rules
have led to judicial efficiency by noting that the Court has had to hear more cases
under Miranda than it ever had to hear using the totality of the circumstances test to
analyze confessions under the Due Process Clause).
284. Michael Beebe, The Judge Who Became a Prisoner of Love, BUFFALO NEWS,
Apr. 30, 1997, at C1. "The privilege against self-incrimination secured by the Consti-
tution applies to all individuals." Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 472 (1966).
285. Monaghan, supra note 17, at 32.
286. See Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 306-07 (1985) (arguing that in a given case,
a confession that is de jure involuntary under Miranda may, in fact, be voluntary in
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In addition, like other species of constitutional common law, the
Miranda rules were formulated subject to revision, amendment, or
outright abrogation by the legislatures. In fact, much of the lan-
guage previously analyzed in the discussion of Gilbert v. Califor-
nia287 closely tracks the language of Miranda, decided one year
prior. Both cases set a floor below which the states and Congress
could not go, 288 invited the legislatures to legislate in the area,289
and adopted a per se rule290 to govern the issues of admissibility
until such time as the legislatures acted to protect the underlying
rights to a fair trial and against self-incrimination.
The Miranda jurisprudence demonstrates that the warnings
share the factors identified by Professor Monaghan as indicative of
constitutional common law. Therefore, Miranda should be recog-
nized for what it is: a subconstitutional set of remedial rules not
mandated by the Fifth Amendment, but created to safeguard the
underlying right against self-incrimination, in other words, consti-
tutional common law.
E. The Legislative Response to Miranda: 18 U.S.C. § 3501
Just two years after the divided Warren Court decided Miranda
v. Arizona, the Senate Judiciary Committee sent to the Senate
floor a bill denying all federal courts of the United States "jurisdic-
tion to review or to reverse, vacate, modify, or disturb in any way, a
ruling of any trial court of any State in any criminal prosecution
admitting in evidence as voluntarily made an admission or confes-
sion of an accused. ''291 If passed as written, the bill would have
gutted the protections the Court prescribed in Miranda. Though
the bill died on the Senate floor, the law passed by Congress and
signed by President Johnson, the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe
Streets Act of 1968 (the "Crime Control Act"), 92 contained a pro-
vision that addressed many of the Senate Judiciary Committee's
that the individual's will may not have been overborne by the pressures of the sta-
tionhouse, the situation Miranda sought to avoid).
287. 388 U.S. 263 (1967).
288. Compare Miranda, 384 U.S. at 467, with Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263,
273 (1967).
289. Compare Miranda, 384 U.S. at 467, with Gilbert, 388 U.S. at 273.
290. Compare Miranda, 384 U.S. at 467, with Gilbert, 388 U.S. at 273.
291. S. 1194, 90th Cong. § 2 (1968), reprinted in S. REP. No. 90-1097, at 54 (1968),
available in 1968 WL 4956 [hereinafter SENATE REPORT].
292. Pub. L. No. 90-351, 82 Stat. 197 (codified in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C. and
42 U.S.C.).
1284
2001] DICKERSON & THE IMPERIAL SUPREMES
concerns. In particular, this provision of the Crime Control Act,
codified as 18 U.S.C. § 3501, stated that:
In any criminal prosecution brought by the United States or by
the District of Columbia, a confession ... shall be admissible in
evidence if it is voluntarily given .... If the trial judge deter-
mines that the confession was voluntarily made it shall be admit-
ted in evidence.293
A subsequent subsection of § 3501 provided the factors the re-
viewing court should take into consideration when analyzing the
circumstances surrounding the suspect's confession. Section
3501(b) directed the trial court to consider the time lapse between
the arrest and the arraignment; whether the suspect knew the na-
ture of the crime charged; whether he was advised of his right to
stay silent and that any statements he made could be used in court;
whether law enforcement advised the suspect of his right to assis-
tance of counsel; and whether the suspect in fact has assistance of
counsel during his interrogation.294
A cursory glance at the statute will reveal that § 3501 is visibly at
odds with large portions of the Miranda decision. Miranda
presumes that custodial interrogation is coercive,295 whereas § 3501
instead looks to the totality of the circumstances. Miranda clearly
articulates that two of its requirements-the right to remain silent,
and the right to, and knowing and effective waiver of, counsel-are
absolute prerequisites to overcoming the presumption of compul-
sion,2 9 6 whereas § 3501 lists them as only non-dispositive factors inthe overall analysis.297
293. 18 U.S.C. § 3501(a) (1994).
294. Id. § 3501(b). In particular, § 3501(b) provides:
The trial judge in determining the issue of voluntariness shall take into con-
sideration all the circumstances surrounding the giving of the confession, in-
cluding (1) the time elapsing between arrest and arraignment of the
defendant making the confession, if it was made after arrest and before ar-
raignment, (2) whether such defendant knew the nature of the offense with
which he was charged or of which he was suspected at the time of making
the confession, (3) whether or not such defendant was advised or knew that
he was not required to make any statement and that any such statement
could be used against him; (4) whether or not such defendant had been ad-
vised prior to questioning of his right to the assistance of counsel; and (5)
whether or not such defendant was without the assistance of counsel when
questioned and when giving such confession.
Id. § 3501(b).
295. Compare Miranda, 384 U.S. at 461, with 18 U.S.C. § 3501.
296. Compare Miranda, 384 U.S. at 468, 471-72, with 18 U.S.C. § 3501.
297. See 18 U.S.C. § 3501.
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Congress clearly knew of Miranda when it passed the Crime
Control Act. The Senate Judiciary Committee drafted the bill to
strip federal courts of jurisdiction to review state court adjudication
of the admissibility of confessions with Miranda directly in its
sights.298 In passing § 3501, Congress intended to abrogate the Mi-
randa requirements and reestablish voluntariness as the standard
governing the admission of confessions. 299 Both the Court of Ap-
peals and the Supreme Court in Dickerson acknowledged this.300
However, as indicated by the Fourth Circuit's affirmative find-
ing,3° 1 and by the fact that Miranda has had such a rich jurispru-
dence under the Burger and Rehnquist Courts, neither the Justice
Department nor the Supreme Court ever seriously advocated
§ 3501 as the authority controlling the admissibility of confessions
in federal courts.30 2 Indeed, the Justice Department effectively
blocked the individual U.S. Attorney Offices from arguing § 3501
in opposition to motions to suppress,30 3 and former Attorney Gen-
eral Reno even praised the Miranda requirements during her ten-
ure as the nation's top law enforcer. 304 In addition, a survey of
state law indicates that the states hardly have embraced Miranda's
invitation to fashion alternate schemes for protecting the underly-
ing Fifth Amendment right.30 5 Thus, § 3501 remained the legisla-
tive response to Miranda, stifled in application for thirty years until
the Fourth Circuit's decision in United States v. Dickerson. °6
298. SENATE REPORT, supra note 291, at 53.
299. SALTZBURG & CAPRA, supra note 24, at 545; SENATE REPORT, supra note 291,
at 54.
300. United States v. Dickerson, 166 F.3d 667, 671 (4th Cir. 1999) (stating that Con-
gress enacted § 3501 "with the express purpose" of overruling Miranda); Dickerson v.
United States, 120 S. Ct. 2326, 2332 (2000) ("[C]ongress intended by its enactment to
overrule Miranda.").
301. Dickerson, 166 F.3d at 695.
302. SALTZBURG & CAPRA, supra note 24, at 545; accord Davis v. United States,
512 U.S. 452, 465 (1994) (Scalia, J., concurring).
303. See supra text accompanying note 12.
304. Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Statement by Attorney General Janet
Reno on Today's Decision Upholding Miranda Ruling (June 26, 2000) ("I am so
pleased that the Supreme Court has reaffirmed a longstanding and workable practice
of police officers advising those they arrest of their right to remain silent.").
305. Paul G. Cassell, Miranda's Social Costs: An Empirical Assessment, 90 Nw. U.
L. REV. 387, 498 (1995). Professor Cassell, a vocal critic of Miranda, successfully ar-
gued the applicability of § 3501 in the Dickerson case before the Fourth Circuit. Dick-
erson, 166 F.3d at 670.
306. United States v. Dickerson, 166 F.3d 667 (4th Cir. 1999).
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III. THE CITADEL UNDER SIEGE: DICKERSON AND THE
CHALLENGE TO MIRANDA
When the Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the Fourth
Circuit's conclusion that § 3501, and not Miranda, governed the ad-
missibility of confessions in federal court, criminal justice scholars
suggested the Court might decide the case based on the narrow
issue of whether the statute comported with Miranda's invitation to
the legislatures to devise alternative devices at least as protective
as the warnings30 7 imposed in the legislative vacuum of 1966.308
However, in a 7-2 majority (comprised of several Justices previ-
ously on the record declaring or joining opinions stating that Mi-
randa was not a constitutional decision, or that the bright line
requirements were not compelled by the Constitution30 9), the
Court held that Congress lacked even the power to pass 18 U.S.C.
§ 3501, because Miranda announced a constitutional rule inviolable
under Marbury.1 °
After acknowledging that Congress retains the power to modify
or supersede judicially created rules of evidence or procedure not
required by the Constitution,311 Chief Justice Rehnquist,312 writing
for the Court, stated that the "but" of that power is that Congress
cannot legislatively supersede the constitutional decisions of the
Court.313 Thus, Dickerson recognized that the fate of Miranda, in
fact, turned on the broader issue of whether the Miranda Court
announced a constitutional rule or was "merely exercis[ing] its su-
pervisory authority to regulate evidence in the absence of congres-
sional direction. 314
307. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467 (1966).
308. Telephone Interview with Daniel J. Capra, Reed Professor of Law, Fordham
University School of Law (Nov. 20, 2000) (confirming remarks made by Professor
Capra just before the Supreme Court heard oral arguments in Dickerson). Professor
Capra is also co-author of the book cited supra note 24.
309. Dickerson v. United States, 120 S. Ct. 2326, 2337 (2000) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(citing Davis v. United States, 512 U.S 452, 457-58 (1994) (opinion of the Court, in
which Kennedy, J., joined); Duckworth v. Eagan, 492 U.S. 195, 203 (1989) (opinion of
the Court, in which Kennedy, J., joined); Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298 (1985)
(O'Connor, J.); New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649 (1984) (Rehnquist, J.)).
310. Dickerson, 120 S. Ct. at 2329-30.
311. Id. at 2332.
312. Recall that Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote for the majority in both Michigan v.
Tucker and New York v. Quarles, and joined in other opinions seeking to place limits
on Miranda. See, e.g., case cited infra note 370 and accompanying text.
313. Dickerson, 120 S. Ct. at 2332.
314. Id. at 2333.
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Turning to that issue, the Court first addressed the Miranda
progeny3"5 that the Fourth Circuit relied heavily upon for its con-
clusion that Miranda was not a constitutional decision and thus
subject to congressional revision.316 The Court admitted that it had
previously characterized the Miranda rules as prophylactic,3"' "not
themselves rights protected by the Constitution, '318 and "not Con-
stitutional in character, '319 but nonetheless concluded that the
Fourth Circuit erred in its holding.320 The Court concluded that it
had consistently applied Miranda to the states-indeed, the Mi-
randa Court returned Ernesto Miranda's case to the state court to
apply the rule on remand.321 The Chief Justice argued that, given
the Supreme Court's lack of supervisory power over state courts,322
"except when necessary to assure compliance with the dictates of
the Federal Constitution,' '323 consistent imposition of the Miranda
requirements on the states, along with decisions of the Court al-
lowing habeas corpus review of Miranda claims, "obviously as-
sumes that Miranda is of constitutional origin.
324
Although the Chief Justice engages in classic circular reasoning
on this point,325 he does contend that the majority opinion in Mi-
randa is "replete with statements indicating that the majority
315. See supra Part II.B.1-4.
316. Dickerson, 120 S. Ct. at 2333.
317. Id. (citing New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 653 (1984)).
318. Dickerson, 120 S. Ct. at 2333 (citing Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 444
(1974)).
319. Dickerson, 120 S. Ct. at 2333 n.2 (citing Winthrow v. Williams, 507 U.S. 680,
690-91 (1993)).
320. Dickerson, 120 S. Ct. at 2333.
321. Id.
322. Mu'Min v. Virginia, 500 U.S. 415, 422 (1991).
323. Dickerson, 120 S. Ct. at 2333 (citing Harris v. Rivera, 454 U.S. 339, 344-45
(1981) (per curiam).
324. Dickerson, 120 S. Ct. at 2333 n.3 (noting that habeas review is limited to viola-
tions of federal law, and that since Miranda was not based on federal laws or treaties,
it must have been based on the Constitution).
325. Circular reasoning, also known as "begging the question," is a logical fallacy
and is characterized by assuming the truth of the conclusion as a basis for drawing the
conclusion. E.g., DOUGLAS WALTON, ARGUMENTS FROM IGNORANCE 230-31 (1996).
The arguer "is 'begging the question' in the sense that he is begging the respondent to
accept, as a presumption (i.e., without proof), a proposition that he is obliged to
prove." Id. at 230. In essence, the Dickerson majority argues: Miranda is constitutional
law. Why? Because we have always applied it to the states. Why have we always applied
it to the states? Because it is constitutional law. The fallacy exists because "the arguer
asks to be granted, without having to prove it, a proposition he is supposed to be
proving." Id. at 231. Recall that Marbury v. Madison has also been criticized as being
based on circular reasoning. See text accompanying supra note 45.
In addition, Dickerson's logically flawed argument that Miranda announced a con-
stitutional decision conflicts directly with the proposition-that Miranda did not an-
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thought it was announcing a constitutional rule. 3 26 He points to
the Miranda Court's ultimate conclusion that the four unwarned
confessions it reviewed "did not meet constitutional standards for
protection of the privilege. 3 27 However, Miranda's creation of a
rule to protect an underlying right does not mean that the rule it-
self is of the same inviolable nature as the right it protects.328 Foot-
note five in Dickerson cites many of the cases that have referred to
Miranda's "constitutional underpinnings," its role as a "safeguard"
of a "fundamental trial right," and its resting on the Fifth Amend-
ment privilege itself.329 However, the Fourth Amendment exclu-
sionary rule has constitutional underpinnings in its protection of
the underlying Fourth Amendment rights against unreasonable
searches and seizures. Yet it remains not a "necessary corollary of
the Fourth Amendment" and not mandated by the Constitution it-
self,33° thus undercutting, by analogy, the strength of the majority's
analysis.
Chief Justice Rehnquist's opinion then turns to the perceived
waxing and waning of the Miranda protections via the expan-
sions331 and exceptions332 to the Miranda rules created by later de-
cisions. These cases, the Chief Justice urges, "illustrate the
principle-not that Miranda is not a constitutional rule-but that
no constitutional rule is immutable."
That said, nor does this jurisprudence stand fully for the proposi-
tion that Miranda did announce a constitutional decision of the
Court, and this is precisely the conclusion the Chief Justice must
establish affirmatively in order to strike down § 3501 properly in
accordance with the Marbury tradition. Arguing that the sum-total
nounce a constitutional decision of the Court-on which Tucker, Elstad, Quarles and
Harris are based. See discussion supra Parts II.B.1-4.
326. Dickerson, 120 S. Ct. at 2334.
327. Id. (quoting Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 491 (1966)).
328. Accord United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 906 (1984) (citing Stone v. Powell,
428 U.S. 465, 486 (1976)) ("[T]he Fourth Amendment has never been interpreted to
proscribe the introduction of illegally seized evidence in all proceedings or against all
persons.").
329. Dickerson, 120 S. Ct. at 2334 n.5 (citing Illinois v. Perkins, 492 U.S. 292, 296
(1990)).
330. Leon, 468 U.S. at 905-06.
331. Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610 (1976) (declaring that due process is offended by
the government using the very invocation of the Miranda right to remain silent to
impeach the testimony of the criminal defendant); Arizona v. Roberson, 486 U.S. 675
(1988) (holding that once the suspect invokes the right to counsel, police may not
initiate an interrogation even about a crime different from that for which the suspect
was arrested).
332. See cases discussed supra Part II.B.1-4.
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of the Miranda jurisprudence does not indicate that Miranda did
not announce a constitutional decision of the Court fails to bolster
the proposition that Miranda did announce a constitutional deci-
sion of the Court.333 In other words, saying that your opponents
are not correct does not mean that you are.
Lastly, the Dickerson majority grounds its decision to uphold Mi-
randa in the policy of stare decisis. As it had stated in the past, the
Court declared that "stare decisis is not an inexorable com-
mand, ' 334 adding also that this is especially true with regard to the
constitutional decisions of the Court,335 for absent constitutional
amendment or outright reversal by the Court, constitutional deci-
sions are immutable.336 Throughout its stare decisis jurisprudence,
the Court has identified five policies/factors used in the balancing
test that governs the Court's decision whether to follow its own
precedent.337 The Court generally will ask:
(1) Has the past decision or line of decisions proven workable
or unworkable? 338
(2) Will overruling the questioned precedent frustrate reasona-
ble reliance interests, both social and commercial? 33
9
(3) Have subsequent developments in the Court's jurisprudence
eroded the doctrinal underpinnings of the questioned
precedent?340
333. Dickerson, 120 S. Ct. at 2333 ("This case therefore turns on whether the Mi-
randa Court announced a constitutional rule . . ").
334. Id. at 2336 (citing State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 20 (1997) (quoting Payne
v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 828 (1991))).
335. Id. at 2336.
336. E.g., Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 235 (1997); Seminole Tribe of Fla. v.
Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 63 (1996).
337. Paulsen, supra note 31, at 1551; accord John Randolph Prince, Forgetting the
Lyrics and Changing the Tune: The Eleventh Amendment and Textual Fidelity, 104
DICK. L. REV 1, 77-78 (citing the criteria discussed in Planned Parenthood of South-
eastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992) (joint plurality opinion) and calling them
"suspiciously flexible" and at times "circular").
338. E.g., Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 531 (declaring
unworkable, and therefore overruling, the rule announced in National League of Cit-
ies v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976)); see also Dickerson, 120 S. Ct. at 2336 (noting how
workable the Miranda rules are in practice).
339. E.g., United States v. Title Ins. & Trust, 265 U.S. 472, 486 (1924), cited by
Casey, 505 U.S. at 854-55. "The Constitution serves human values, and while the ef-
fects of reliance on Roe cannot exactly be measured, neither can the certain cost of
overruling Roe for people who have ordered their thinking and living around that
case be dismissed." Casey, 505 U.S. at 856.
340. E.g., Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 208 (1997) (stating that the rule estab-
lished in Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402 (1985) was inconsistent with intervening Es-
tablishment Clause jurisprudence and therefore overruled); Casey, 505 U.S at 860
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(4) Have the facts or assumptions underlying the precedent
changed? 34
1
(5) Will overturning the precedent undermine the American
public's impressions of judicial integrity and political
independence?
342
When the Court in Planned Parenthood v. Casey 3 4 3 addressed
whether Roe v. Wade344 should be upheld on stare decisis grounds,
the Justices writing the joint plurality opinion used these factors to
analyze Roe and its progeny extensively, ultimately filling more
than fifteen pages of the United States Reports with reasons for re-
taining "the essential holding" of Roe.345 The Dickerson Court de-
votes fewer than three pages to its stare decisis discussion.346
Although pithy stare decisis analysis is the rule rather than the ex-
ception, because the Miranda jurisprudence left Miranda with a
shaky constitutional foundation, and therefore resting largely on
stare decisis, the Dickerson opinion deserved a Casey-style inten-
sive analysis. That said, the stare decisis analysis the Dickerson
Court does offer remains unconvincing.
At the outset of its stare decisis analysis, the Dickerson Court
urges that the Miranda warnings have become part of our national
culture and embedded in routine police practice. 347 However, the
("[N]o erosion of principle going to liberty or personal autonomy has left Roe's cen-
tral holding a doctrinal remnant.").
341. E.g., Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 494-95 (1954) (Warren, C.J.) (repu-
diating the "separate but equal rule" announced in Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537
(1896), that upheld legally proscribed racial segregation). "[T]he Plessy Court's expla-
nation for its decision was so clearly at odds with the facts apparent to the Court in
1954 that the decision to reexamine Plessy was on this ground alone not only justified
but required." Casey, 505 U.S. at 863.
342. E.g., Casey, 505 U.S. at 864-67. "The legitimacy of the Court would fade with
the frequency of its vacillation." Id. at 866. Contra Dickerson, 120 S. Ct. at 2347
(Scalia, J., dissenting) ("I see little harm in admitting that we made a mistake.").
343. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
344. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
345. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 854-70.
346. Three pages in the United States Reports is the author's estimation based on
the length of the discussion as published in the Supreme Court Reporter. Dickerson v.
United States will be published in volume 530 of the United States Reports, which was
not yet available when this volume of the Fordham Urban Law Journal went to press.
347. Dickerson, 120 S. Ct. at 2336; accord Casey, 505 U.S. at 856 (indicating that in
the two decades since Roe v. Wade legalized abortion, people in society had ordered
their lives, organized their intimate relationships, and made defining personal deci-
sions in reliance on the continued prospect of choosing an abortion should contracep-
tion fail). The author questions seriously whether the Court has entered on a
troubling-and potentially dangerous-slippery slope in the past decade by referring
to factors such as public consciousness, national culture, and its own public relations
in its more contentious cases, such as Dickerson, Casey, and the 2000 Presidential
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Court never has held as dispositive any of the factors discussed in
its stare decisis analyses.3 a8 In addition, this factor, although cen-
tral to the Court's analysis in Casey,349 is of dubious value in light
of the Court's celebrated decision in Brown v. Board of Educa-
tion.35° The Brown Court overturned Plessy v. Ferguson,35' an
opinion that was "on the books" for far more time than Miranda
has been-1896 through 1954 for Plessy versus 1966 to the present
for Miranda. The Plessy holding, permitting separate but equal ac-
commodations for blacks and whites, had imbedded itself farther
into the national consciousness than Miranda has, affecting not just
the behavior and lives of law enforcement and criminal defendants,
but forming the legal basis for the prevailing social order in the
pre-Civil Rights era South. To paraphrase the Casey plurality, far
more people had ordered their lives and modes of thinking around
Plessy, which was unanimously overruled, than Miranda, which
survives.352
The stare decisis analysis then turned to Miranda as undermined
precedent, concluding that subsequent developments had not actu-
ally eroded Miranda, but that the cases limiting its breadth merely
reduced its impact on law enforcement, all while retaining its core
premise.353 However, this result is inconsistent with previous stare
decisis analyses of the Court-the Court has denied stare decisis
effect to precedent undermined by less intervening case law than
the Court faced in Dickerson.354
Election cases cited infra note 378. If the Constitution truly is designed to protect all
Americans from majoritarian excessses, then what "the people" think of the Court
should not matter to the Court nearly as much as the question: "Are we being faithful
to the Constitution?" While outside the scope of this Comment, it is certainly food for
thought.
348. See, e.g., Holder v. Hall, 512 U.S. 874, 930 n.7 (1994) ("Determining whether
to abandon prior decisions requires weighing a multitude of factors, one of the most
important of which is the extent to which the decisions in question have proved
unworkable.").
349. Casey, 505 U.S. at 860-61.
350. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
351. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
352. The Casey plurality drew intense criticism from Justices White, Scalia, Thomas
and Chief Justice Rehnquist in dissent, and one of their more pointed criticisms is of
the plurality's invocation of Brown. To the dissenters, Brown stands as a case in which
the Court ignored stare decisis principles to reach the correct result, as opposed to the
Casey plurality, which invoked stare decisis to uphold Roe without regard to whether
Roe was correct when decided. Casey, 505 U.S. at 982-83 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
353. Dickerson, 120 S. Ct. at 2336.
354. See, e.g., Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 223-27 (1997) (discussing the inter-
vening law announced in Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 509 U.S. 1 (1993),
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The Dickerson majority also emphasized workability-the bright
line rule announced in Miranda is easier for both law enforcement
officials and courts to apply than the totality of the circumstances
review called for by due process concerns and § 3501. 355 However,
bright line rules are, by their very nature, designed to avoid a more
intensive inquiry,356 so the bright line nature of the warnings alone
cannot be a reason for upholding them as constitutional law on
stare decisis grounds. In addition, the trimester framework set
forth to insure the constitutional right protected by Roe v. Wade
was a bright line rule, and yet the joint plurality in Casey replaced
it with a more intensive totality of the circumstances approach.357
In sum, the stare decisis analysis is not nearly as convincing as
the Chief Justice's opinion would appear,358 especially in light of
the conclusion that the Dickerson opinion is so riddled with logical
flaws and a misreading of precedent that the case must rest largely
on the strength of its stare decisis analysis of Miranda.3 -9 Assum-
ing the Court incorrectly asserted that Miranda delivered a consti-
tutional decision, and given that the Court has a constitutional duty
under separation of powers principles to give effect to the acts of
Congress, we are left with a related constitutional quandary: how
can the judicially created policy of stare decisis supersede the will
of Congress in enacting 18 U.S.C. § 3501 pursuant to its Article I
powers? 360
IV. THE FATE OF CONSTITUTIONAL COMMON LAW
AFTER DICKERSON
The Supreme Court's decision in Dickerson v. United States, al-
though settling the lingering questions regarding the constitutional
status of the venerable Miranda decision, still left open a number
and Witters v. Wash. Dep't of Servs. for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481 (1986) that had so
undermined the precedent in question so as to justify denying it stare decisis effect).
355. Dickerson, 120 S. Ct. at 2336.
356. See text accompanying supra note 24; Monaghan, supra note 17, at 32.
357. Casey, 505 U.S. at 874 (directing that the appropriate test for assessing the
constitutionality of abortion regulations is determining whether the questioned regu-
lations place an "undue burden" on the right).
358. Compare Dickerson, 120 S. Ct. at 2336 (Rehnquist, C.J.) ("Following the rule
of stare decisis, we decline to overrule Miranda.") (emphasis added), with Payne v.
Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 828 (1991) (Rehnquist, C.J.) ("Stare decisis is not an inexo-
rable command; rather it is a principle of policy and not a mechanical formula of
adherence to the latest decision .... This is particularly true in constitutional cases.")
(internal quotations and citations omitted).
359. See Paulsen, supra note 31 and accompanying text.
360. Id.
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of questions, including the continued vitality of the theory of con-
stitutional common law.361
A. R.I.P. Constitutional Common Law?
Recall that constitutional common law's proponents posit that
the Court has crafted a large body of subconstitutional rules in-
spired by the Constitution and protecting values and rights explicit
or implicit in the text.362 Miranda v. Arizona is one of the cases
that perhaps necessitated the crafting of the theory. 63 According
to Professor Monaghan, Miranda presented a subconstitutional set
of prophylactic rules not compelled by the Fifth Amendment but
that protects the underlying privilege.364 The opinion of the Court
in Dickerson cuts far the other way-instead of setting forth a set
of subconstitutional rules, it argues Miranda announced an inviola-
ble constitutional rule.365
Constitutional common law theorists also contend that constitu-
tional common law is subject to ratification, alteration, amend-
ment, and outright reversal by Congress.366 Dickerson, on the
other hand, states that Miranda, one of the cases upon which the
theory of constitutional common law is founded, was not subject to
Congress's interference, because it was a constitutional decision of
the Court, made inviolable through the Supremacy Clause by way
361. Another large issue that Dickerson did not settle concerns the continued vital-
ity of those cases: permitting Miranda-defective confessions to impeach the direct tes-
timony of criminal defendants, admitting into evidence the fruits of Miranda-defective
confessions, and admitting confessions obtained pursuant to the public safety excep-
tion. See discussion supra Parts II.B.1-4. Although Chief Justice Rehnquist's opinion
for the Court suggests that these cases remain vital, this Comment seriously questions
this result. Those cases are grounded principally in the proposition that Miranda was
not a constitutional decision of the Court. See discussion supra Parts II.B.1-4. Harris,
Tucker, Elstad, and Quarles simply cannot be correct any longer if Dickerson is the
definitive interpretation of Miranda.
Additionally, it is difficult to reconcile the continued admission of Miranda-defec-
tive confessions to impeach in light of Mincey's admonition that due process princi-
ples forbid the admission of involuntary confessions-arguably, since Miranda
announced a constitutional decision of the Court, part of which states that unwarned
confessions are presumptively involuntary, due process will be offended by the admis-
sion for any purpose of a confession that is defective for failing to meet Miranda's
now-constitutional standards.
362. For a fuller discussion of the theory of constitutional common law, see supra
Part I.D.
363. Monaghan, supra note 17, at 3 ("[A] theory of... constitutional common law
is necessary to explain satisfactorily a number of 'constitutional' doctrines . . ").
364. See id. at 20 ("Miranda v. Arizona, for example, did not claim immutable con-
stitutional status for its famous gloss on the privilege against self-incrimination ... .
365. Dickerson v. United States, 120 S. Ct. 2326, 2329, 2336 (2000).
366. Supra Part I.E.1.
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of Marbury.367 In essence, the Court pulled the carpet out from
under the theory and the theorists, elevating Miranda to the level
of conventional constitutional law, and abrogating the need to have
a theory justifying Miranda in the first place.
B. The Death Knell: Troubling Constitutional Implications
However, the Court's rendering moot much of a twenty-five year
old theory is not the alarming implication of the Dickerson analy-
sis. Recall that the theory of constitutional common law includes
recognizing that the violable nature of constitutional common law
helps reconcile many Court decisions with the principles of federal-
ism and separation of powers.368 Monaghan argued that by al-
lowing the state and federal legislatures to overrule its
constitutional common law dictates, the Court maintained a satis-
factory role in the constitutional system vis-A-vis the states and the
other branches of the national government. Dickerson proclaimed
a constitutional decision resting largely on circular reasoning, a
reading of precedent inconsistent with the plain language and rea-
soning of that precedent, and a thinly argued invocation of stare
decisis. After Dickerson, we are faced with a Supreme Court that
can pronounce, "We announced a constitutional decision of the
Court because we said we announced a constitutional decision of
the Court." This hypothetical pronouncement is not constitutional
law but instead justice-by-fiat, thus invoking the title of this piece:
is Dickerson the birth of "Do as I say (follow the Constitution, o ye
Congress and states) and not as I do"-type constitutional
adjudication?
The Court also entered the slipperiest of slopes in Dickerson: by
elevating the gloss on the Fifth Amendment privilege to the status
of inviolable constitutional law, the Dickerson reasoning allows for
the possibility that the gloss on the gloss on the constitutional privi-
lege will be raised to the status of inviolable constitutional law.
Prior to his scathing dissent in Dickerson, Justice Scalia had this to
say regarding that possibility:
The newest tower, according to the Court, is needed to avoid
"inconsisten[cy] with [the] purpose" of Edwards' prophylactic
rule,369 which was needed to protect Miranda's prophylactic
367. For a short discussion of Marbury and its importance, see supra Part I.A.
368. Monaghan, supra note 17, at 34-38.
369. Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 484-85 (1981) ("[W]hen an accused has in-
voked his right to have counsel present during custodial interrogation ... [he] is not
subject to further interrogation by the authorities until counsel has been made availa-
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right to have counsel present, which was needed to protect the
right against compelled self-incrimination found (at last!) in the
Constitution.37 °
Indeed, the question Dickerson leaves us is: where does it end?
How much will the Court read into the Constitution, and can the
Justices draw a meaningful boundary as to the rights protected by
the Constitution? A satisfying constitutional theory demands an
answer to these unsettling and unresolved questions. The
Supremacy Clause, which directs that the Constitution is the su-
preme law of the land-and not glosses upon glosses upon
glosses-demands an answer. Reasonable people can disagree
about the propriety of requiring police officers to apprise criminal
suspects of their rights to remain silent and have counsel present
during interrogation. Dickerson arguably deserves praise for con-
tinuing to protect all people who might be subject to the inherently
coercive nature of the station house interrogation. However, the
means to the end are ultimately unsatisfactory. Despite Justice
Brennan's famous advice to the contrary,371 the label "constitu-
tional law" should not affix to whatever between five and nine Jus-
tices of the Supreme Court decide to affix that label to.372 If that
indeed is the case, then Justice Scalia will be remembered for these
parting words in Dickerson:
In imposing its Court-made code upon the States, the original
opinion [Miranda] at least asserted that it was demanded by the
Constitution. Today's decision does not pretend that it is-and
yet still asserts the right to impose it against the will of the peo-
ple's representatives in Congress .... [W]e cannot allow to re-
main on the books even a celebrated decision-especially a
celebrated decision-that has come to stand for the proposition
that the Supreme Court has power to impose extraconstitutional
constraints upon Congress and the States. This is not the system
ble to him, unless the accused himself initiates further communication, exchanges, or
conversations with the police,")
370. Minnick v. Mississippi, 498 U.S. 146, 166 (1990) (Scalia, J., dissenting). Chief
Justice Rehnquist, who announced the opinion of the Court in Dickerson, joined Jus-
tice Scalia in the Minnick dissent. Id. at 156.
371. Justice Anthony Kennedy, Address at Fordham University School of Law
(Jan. 24, 2001) (relating a popular story that Justice Brennan would introduce his new
clerks to the world of the Supreme Court by advising them that the most important
number in the world is five, because it only takes five to form a Court majority).
372. See Dickerson v. United States, 120 S. Ct. 2326, 2348 (2000) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
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that was established by the Framers, or that would be estab-
lished by any sane supporter of government by the people.373
C. "Why Beholdest Thou The Mote That Is In Thy Brother's
Eye, But Considerest Not The Beam That Is In Thine Own
Eye? '374 and What the Court Should Do to Police Itself
Given the Court's recent willingness to strike down acts of Con-
gress as exceeding the scope of its enumerated Article I powers, we
are left wondering whether Dickerson created a double standard:
that Congress is bound by federalism and separations of powers
principles, but the Court is not. Though it remains doubtful that
the three committed federalists (Chief Justice Rehnquist and Jus-
tices O'Connor and Kennedy) who joined the 7-2 Dickerson major-
ity would agree that they helped created a double standard, there
are workable solutions to avoid a future finding that Dickerson did
just that.
1. Strip the Court of Jurisdiction?
When the Senate Judiciary Committee sent to the Senate floor
the bill that eventually became 18 U.S.C. § 3501, the bill contained
a provision stripping the federal courts of jurisdiction to review
state court determinations of the admissibility of confessions.375
The Senate Report preemptively defended this move, grounding
the Judiciary Committee's choice in Article III, which directs that
"the supreme court shall have appellate jurisdiction ... with such
exceptions ... as the Congress shall make, '3 76 and in the Court's
own decision in Ex Parte McCardle.377 Therefore, stripping or lim-
iting the Court's power to review Miranda claims remains a poten-
tial solution. However, any Congressional debates on removing
even part of the Supreme Court's jurisdiction over any case-
landmark or otherwise-likely would be a highly-charged political
event. Such a dramatic confrontation also would tarnish the pub-
lic's faith in the Court as an institution above the political fray to a
degree far greater than did the perceived debacle of the state and
federal judiciaries effectively deciding the 2000 presidential elec-
373. Id.
374. Matthew 7:3 (King James).
375. SENATE REPORT, supra note 291, at 54.
376. U.S. CON T. art. III, § 2.
377. 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506 (1869).
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tion,378 and do so in a manner not seen since the Court packing
scheme of President Franklin Roosevelt. 379
Even if such a measure did pass through Congress, it is question-
able if the president would affix a signature to such political dyna-
mite. Recall that both Democratic and Republican administrations
effectively blocked the implementation of 18 U.S.C. § 3501, prefer-
ring instead the relative ease of the bright line Miranda inquiry.38 °
Moreover, denying the Court jurisdiction to police its specific hold-
ing in Miranda, that the per se rule of exclusion governs the admis-
sibility of confessions in state and federal courts, leaves undented
the far more troubling implication of Dickerson: what Justice Scalia
bitterly characterized as a freewheeling power of the Court to sub-
vert the will of the duly elected representatives of the people to its
own. 381  The solution to this larger problem cannot come from
Capitol Hill. The only tenable solution must come from the Su-
preme Court itself.
378. Compare Bush v. Gore, 121 S. Ct. 525, 542 (2000) (Stevens, J., dissenting)
("Although we may never know with complete certainty the identity of the winner of
this year's Presidential election, the identity of the loser is perfectly clear. It is the
Nation's confidence in the judge as an impartial guardian of the rule of law."), with
Gore v. Harris, No. SCOO-2431, 2000 Fla. LEXIS 2373, at *57-58 (Fla. 2000) (Wells,
Ch. J., dissenting).
[W]e run a great risk that every election will result in judicial testing. Judicial
restraint in respect to elections is absolutely necessary because the health of
our democracy depends on elections being decided by voters-not by judges.
We must have the self-discipline not to become embroiled in political con-
tests whenever a judicial majority subjectively concludes to do so because
the majority perceives it is "the right thing to do." Elections involve the
other branches of government. A lack of self-discipline in being involved in
elections, especially by a court of last resort, always has the potential of lead-
ing to a crisis with the other branches of government and raises serious sepa-
ration-of-powers concerns.
Harris, 2000 Fla. LEXIS 2373, at *57-58 (emphasis added).
379. Just after his second inauguration in 1937, President Roosevelt proposed a
plan, inspired by a series of Supreme Court decisions striking down New Deal legisla-
tion, under which the President would have the power to appoint additional Justices
to the Supreme Court for every Justice who reached the age of seventy without retir-
ing or resigning. GUNTHER & SULLIVAN, supra note 42, at 183. The Senate Judiciary
Committee rejected the plan, declaring it "a measure which should be so emphatically
rejected that its parallel will never again be presented to the free representatives of
the free people of America." SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, REORGANIZATION
OF THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY, S. REP. No. 75-711, at 23 (1937).
380. Cf Dickerson v. United States, 120 S. Ct. 2326, 2336 (2000) (indicating that the
inquiry required by 18 U.S.C. § 3501 (1994) is more difficult for law enforcement to
conform to than the Miranda inquiry).
381. Dickerson, 120 S. Ct. at 2348 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
1298
2001] DICKERSON & THE IMPERIAL SUPREMES 1299
2. Court-Made Solution to the Court-Made Problem
First, the Court actually must realize the implication of Dicker-
son-that it can impose its will upon the states and Congress ab-
sent a constitutional mandate. In elevating Miranda to the ranks of
conventional constitutional law and overruling Congress despite
Chief Justice Warren's invitation to Congress to legislate in this
area, the Court comes dangerously close to returning to its repudi-
ated Lochner382 Doctrine, effectively passing judgment on the wis-
dom, as opposed to the legality, of legislative acts. The Rehnquist
Court has made some serious claims to being a Court devoted to
principles of federalism and separation of powers, overturning
seemingly beneficial laws despite the beneficial roles these laws
might have played in the nation. United States v. Lopez, for exam-
ple, involved a law passed to protect children.383 United States v.
Morrison384 concerned a section of the Violence Against Women
Act 385 that created a civil cause of action in federal court for crimes
motivated by gender.386 Yet the Court dubbed both of these benefi-
cial laws unconstitutional invocations of Congress's power to regu-
late interstate commerce.387 Dickerson, too, involved a beneficial
law/judicially crafted remedy that protected secluded criminal sus-
pects from the coercive and intimidating environs of the police sta-
tion house. This alone, however, cannot sustain Miranda any more
than the good intentions of Congress underlying the laws in Lopez
and Morrison could carry those cases over the constitutional hur-
dle. Against the background of its recent cases redefining federal-
382. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905). The Lochner case has come to stand
for the impropriety of the Supreme Court passing its judgment on the wisdom-
rather than the true legality-of the acts of the other branches of government by
invoking vague notions of liberty through substantive due process. See Ry. Express
Agency v. New York, 336 U.S. 106, 109 (1949) ("We do not sit to weigh evidence on
the due process issue in order to determine whether the regulation is sound or appro-
priate; nor is it our function to pass judgment on its wisdom."), cited by Paul E. Mc-
Greal, Alaska Equal Protection: Constitutional Law or Common Law, 15 ALASKA L.
REv. 209, 241 (1998) ("The ghost of Lochner haunted the Court in Railway Express
Agency. Before reaching the equal protection claim, the Court made clear that it was
done with Lochner due process."). Several years prior to the Railway Express case,
the Supreme Court had repudiated the Lochner substantive due process approach to
economic liberties shortly after the Court Packing crisis during the New Deal. United
States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144 (1938).
383. 514 U.S. 549 (1995) (striking down Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990, 18
U.S.C. § 922(q)(1)(A), which prohibited possession of firearms in school zone).
384. 120 S. Ct. 1740 (2000).
385. Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat. 1902 (1994) (codified throughout various sec-
tions of 18 U.S.C. and 42 U.S.C.).
386. 42 U.S.C. § 13981(b)-(c) (2000).
387. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 567-68; Morrison, 120 S. Ct. at 1759.
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ism vis-A-vis Congress, the Court must reassess its own approach to
defining what constitutional law is, for it is only then that the Court
can begin to place meaningful limits on it own power, and silence
the critics who insist the Court is one of limited jurisdiction.
Whether that redefining should embrace the originalism
preached by Justices Scalia388 and Thomas,389 or allow for a
broader interpretation of what rights the Constitution encom-
passes, is not a conclusion this Comment ultimately wishes to draw.
Whatever approach the Court does adopt, it should do so "in ac-
cordance with a comprehensive plan, ' 390 to borrow a phrase from,
and to draw a parallel to, municipal planning. The parallels to mu-
nicipal planning suggest why the Court would benefit from adopt-
ing a comprehensive plan for the limits of its constitutional
interpretation-avoiding decisions filling temporal needs that lose
sight of the "big picture," that the federal courts are courts of lim-
ited jurisdiction, bound, in the same way Congress and the states
are, by the constitutional doctrines of federalism and separation of
powers. A comprehensive plan for the methods of constitutional
interpretation also will prevent the unreasonable and unexpected
expansions of the Court's power that foster the impression that the
Court bends constitutional law to the personal predilections of the
individual Justices. 391 Ideally, the Court will do for itself what
388. E.g., Antonin Scalia, Essay, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L.
REV. 1175, 1184 (1989) ("For example, it is perhaps easier for me than it is for some
judges to develop general rules, because I am more inclined to adhere closely to the
plain meaning of a text.").
389. E.g., Lopez, 514 U.S. at 584 (Thomas, J., concurring) ("In a future case, we
ought to temper our Commerce Clause jurisprudence in a manner that both makes
sense of our more recent case law and is more faithful to the original understanding of
that Clause."); Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997).
390. Cf. Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 513 (1977) (citing Village of
Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926) (declaring that the creation of mu-
nicipal zoning ordinances is a valid exercise of the police power)). The requirement
that municipalities enact zoning ordinances in accordance with a comprehensive plan
provides an interesting point of comparison. In the municipal planning context, the
comprehensive plan requirement: (1) prevents arbitrary exercise of conferred power,
Mesolella v. City of Providence, 439 A.2d 1370, 1374 (R.I. 1982); (2) compels the
municipality to divine a plan for the future before acting on the temporal need for
zoning, Rockhill v. Chesterfield Township, 128 A.2d 473 (N.J. 1956); and (3) helps to
prevent the danger of spot zoning, zoning which singles out specific areas for different
treatment, Jimmies, Inc. v. West Haven Planning & Zoning Comm'n, No. 373221,
1997 WL 149682, at *3 (Conn. Super. Ct. Mar. 18, 1997).
391. Cf Henry Paul Monaghan, Stare Decisis and Constitutional Adjudication, 88
COLUM. L. REV 723 (1988).
Because a coherent rationale for the intermittent invocation of stare decisis
has not been forthcoming, the impression is created that the doctrine is in-
voked only as a mask hiding other considerations .... Stare decisis seem-
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Chief Justice Warren did for Congress and the states in Miranda-
set a ground floor392 (of deriving inviolable rights from the Consti-
tution below which the Court should not go) and demand (of itself)
"something that works. ' 393
CONCLUSION
Justice Louis Brandeis once noted that the best intentions make
for the worst law. 94 The seven Justices forming the majority in
Dickerson v. United States reached the objectively "correct" result
by preserving the judicially crafted remedy of Miranda. This con-
clusion is especially cogent in light of the increasing difficulty crim-
inal defendants face in availing themselves of general due process
notions to attack the admissibility of involuntary confessions.395
However, the correct ends do not justify the wrong means-the
Court upheld Miranda by largely misreading recent precedent, by
elevating a formerly subconstitutional decision to the status of con-
stitutional law, and by reaching beyond its own precedent into ar-
eas reserved to Congress and the states. Protecting the underlying
right against self-incrimination guaranteed by the Fifth Amend-
ment is hardly the "czarist arrogance ' 396 of "dictator[s] in black
ingly operates with the randomness of a lightning bolt .... A satisfactory
theory of constitutional adjudication requires more than that.
Id. at 743; see also text accompanying infra note 397.
392. Cf Monaghan, supra note 17, at 37; cf Commonwealth v. Matos, 672 A.2d 769
(Pa. 1995).
The federal Constitution provides a minimum of rights below which the
states cannot go. Where our Court . . . finds that the police violated the
defendant's federal constitutional rights, there is no reason for the Court to
go further and address what additional protections the Pennsylvania Consti-
tution might also provide.
Matos, 672 A.2d at 774 n.7 (citations omitted).
393. E.g., Arthur G. LeFrancois, On Exorcising The Exclusionary Demons: An Es-
say On Rhetoric, Principle, And The Exclusionary Rule, 53 U. CIN. L. REV. 49, 77
(1984) ("It seems the Court in Miranda was demanding that something work to pro-
tect fifth amendment values and conceded that no particular protective device is read
into the constitutional safeguard."); cf John Kaplan, The Limits of the Exclusionary
Rule, 26 STAN. L. REV. 1027, 1030 (1974)).
394. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 479 (1928), cited by Chandler v.
Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 323 (1997).
395. See cases cited and text accompanying supra note 122; see also Arizona v.
Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279 (1991) (stating that, although it will be the rare case indeed,
some involuntary and coerced confessions may be admissible despite being involun-
tary, if the government can prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the admission of
the involuntary confession into evidence was harmless).
396. Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 999 (1992)
(Scalia, J., dissenting); accord Dickerson v. United States, 120 S. Ct. 2326, 2348 (2000)
(Scalia, J., dissenting) ("Today's judgment converts Miranda from a milestone of judi-
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robes. '39 7 However, until the Court backs off the slippery slope
and away from the full implication of its decision in Dickerson, the
critics of the "imperial judiciary" may be vindicated in decrying the
broad sweep of power the unelected federal judiciary has claimed
for itself.
cial overreaching into the very Cheops' Pyramid (or perhaps the Sphinx would be a
better analogue) of judicial arrogance.").
397. Remarks of Patrick J. Buchanan, Syndicated Columnist (Aug. 7, 1988), re-
printed in HARR & WOLF, supra note 86, at 461.
[E]iected officials lacked the courage to stand up to judges ... for the gross
usurpations of power in which federal courts have engaged since the Warren
era. What is happening in Yonkers is an outrage .... A Harvard-educated
dictator in black robes, elected by no one, is ordering the fourth-largest city
in New York ... to spend millions of tax dollars building public housing it
doesn't want or need, in areas Leonard Burke Sand alone shall determine. If
Yonkers refuses, the judge will destroy the city financially and jail its elected
officials. Will someone explain to me what exactly George III did to our
forefathers to compare with that?
Id. (emphasis added). In the Yonkers litigation, Judge Sand of the Southern District of
New York issued contempt sanctions against the City "starting at $100 on Day 1 and
doubling in amount each day of continued noncompliance. The cumulative total of
the fines against the City would exceed $10,000 by day 7, exceed $1 million by day 14,
exceed $200 million by day 21, and exceed $26 billion by day 28." United States v.
City of Yonkers, 856 F.2d 444, 450 (2d Cir. 1988) (emphasis added). The Second Cir-
cuit affirmed the sanction as modified. Yonkers, 856 F.2d at 460.
Shortly before the completion of this Comment, Judge Sand issued the latest deci-
sion in this protracted twenty-year litigation. United States v. Yonkers, 80 Civ. 6761
(LBS), 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17313, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 30, 2000); Mark Hamblett,
Judge Refers Yonkers Case For Remedies, N.Y. L.J., Dec. 1, 2000, at 1 ("A federal
appeals court told Southern District Judge Leonard Sand he had failed to support a
finding that vestiges of segregation remained in the Yonkers school system in 1997.
But yesterday, ruling on remand.., a frustrated Judge Sand reiterated that vestiges of
segregation still existed.").
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